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Truth and Hierarchy:
Will the Circle Be Unbroken?
DAVID FRASER*
One cannot conceive truth without the madness
of the law
-J. DerridaO NE of the main preoccupations of American constitutional
law scholarship continues to be the justification of judicial re-
view in the liberal democratic tradition. Writers of the left, right,
and center continue to grapple with the countermajoritarian im-
plications of judicial review." This Article attempts to redefine
and clarify the debate by examining some of the premises of both
the liberal tradition and its leftist critics.'
Most attempts to legitimize judicial review have focused pri-
marily on institutional or structural concerns. While many attacks
on judicial activism have come from those opposed to the substan-
tive outcome of court decisions, the primary theoretical focus of
discussion among scholars has been the proper role of courts. Sub-
stantive and structural motivations are often inextricably en-
twined, but they remain conceptually distinguishable. The as-
sumption of the present debate in law is that results are
unimportant. For these scholars, the issue continues to be not
what should be decided, but who should decide; certain results can
* Assistant Professor, Dalhousie Law School (Halifax, Nova Scotia).
Several colleagues have commented on earlier drafts of this Article. All blame must be
attributed to them. The credit is entirely my own.
1. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); P. BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE (1982); J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTrUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding,
60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brest, The Misconceived Quest]; Brest, Inter-
pretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
2. This Article shall not address theories commonly associated with the political right.
Conservative attempts to limit judicial review to a search for "original intent" have been
debunked in both theory and practice. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 1. For a
discussion of original intent, see infra text accompanying note 97.
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be legitimated only if the proper branch of government can claim
responsibility. The what, in other words, is contingent upon the
who.
Such a debate is false and misleading. The concern of scholar-
ship and politics must be truth, not structure. Yet an, understand-
ing of the developments of liberal theory which have defined the
contours of the debate is essential to the goal of establishing truth
as the real focus of our practice.
The primary concern of liberalism in the area of judicial re-
view has been with the preservation of a decisionmaking hierar-
chy. The battle has taken place between defenders of Congress's
decisionmaking authority and defenders of that of the courts.
This confrontation has been falsified, however; it confuses means
with ends. Rather than expressing concern for the questions of
substance raised at the level of constitutional adjudication, liberal
legal theory has satisfied itself with a stunted inquiry into the rela-
tions between two branches of the state apparatus. This is the fun-
damental error of liberal discussions of the role of judicial review.
It is an error which is repeated in the ideas of theorists as seem-
ingly diverse as Alexander Bickel, Charles Black, and Ronald
Dworkin. These scholars, while representing a wide spectrum of
liberal thought, are betrayed by an almost single-minded emphasis
on hierarchy.
A better, indeed a truer, ground for concern is the validity of
each constitutional decision on its merits. Concern with truth is
simply more important than concern with hierarchy. But hierar-
chy, or at least present discussion of hierarchy, is not without posi-
tive value. It is essential that we conceive of a process by which we
can achieve our constitutional goals. To this extent, the emphasis
on means is proper. But, by definition, means and process are use-
ful only if they are developed to facilitate the achievement of cer-
tain specific goals.
Liberal emphasis on a process-based hierarchy has failed
largely because it has ignored debate over values. Critical attempts
at defining new forms of government immanent in liberal democ-
racy must avoid this pitfall. Our efforts to create efficacious mech-
anisms for human flourishing must never lose sight of the substan-
tive goals which such mechanisms are meant to facilitate.
The goals of this essay, thus, are two-fold: First, to demon-
strate the inherently stultifying nature of the present focus on
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decisionmaking hierarchy by examining existing liberal theory
and practice in the debate over judicial review; second, to explore
the possibility of developing a critical theory to overthrow current
(liberal) practice. This Article sketches a practical and theoretical
framework which will allow us to attempt such a critique despite
enormous practical and theoretical difficulties, not the least of
which is the tenuous "immanent critique" available under modern
capitalism.
Toward this end, a seemingly eclectic methodology is em-
ployed. This undertaking has been inspired by the critical spirit of
the Frankfurt School,3 the potential opening to greater political
interpretive worlds of modern hermeneutics,4 and finally the
often underestimated political import of deconstructionism. 5 No
claim is made to a thoroughly accurate representation of these
theories. Rather, the goals of this work are to offer an effective
critique of liberal ideas of the validity of judicial review and to put
forward a personal proposal for a critical methodology and prac-
tice which will enable discussion of values other than those di-
rectly associated with structural hierarchy.
Such a proposal is made necessary by the failure of the left,
and particularly of critical legal studies,' to offer a coherent the-
ory with which to combat the entrenched power of liberalism.
This failure is marked by a perpetual inability to go beyond criti-
3. For works representative of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, see, inter alia, T.
ADORNO, E. FRENKEL-BRUNSWICK, D. LEVISON & K SANFORD, in collaboration with B. ARON,
M. LEVISON & W. MORRow, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950); J. HABERMAS, COMMU-
NICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SocIETr (1979); J. HABERMAS, THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1973); M. HORKHEIMER & T. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTMENT (1972); H. MARcUsE,
EROS AND CIVILIZATION (1966); H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964).
4. See, e.g., H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (1975). The conflict between hermeneu-
tics and critical theory, particularly Habermas's view of communication, is well docu-
mented. The view adopted here is that proposed by Paul Ricoeur: that the common
ground between the two schools is greater than the area of disagreement. See P. RicOEuR,
Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology, in HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN ScIENcEs 63-100
(1981).
5. See, e.g., J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976).
6. The Conference on Critical Legal Studies is an agglomeration of Marxist and non-
Marxist scholars, lawyers and others, joined by a desire to provide a radical critique of law.
It now appears to have solidified its position in academia to such an extent that it must
cope with the pitfalls of "trendiness." For a good introduction to the eclectic nature of the
Critical Legal Studies movement, see THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D.
Kairys ed. 1982); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as CLS Symposium].
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cism to a "practical" alternative. It is hoped that the proposal set
forth here will in some way aid in the escape from the alleged
utopian nature of critical theory to the practical application of
progressive ideals.
Part I briefly examines the work of two apparently opposed
scholars, Alexander Bickel and Charles Black. Their work, when
viewed in light of certain Supreme Court decisions, points not
only to the fundamental fallacy of liberal doctrine as we know it,
but to the proper redefinition of the task of legal theory. In an
overtly dialectic turn, this Article then demonstrates that the em-
phasis placed on the notion of "dialogue," particularly in Bickel's
work, contains the key to the development of a critical hermeneu-
tics. In other words, the lexicon of a progressive doctrine leading
to a reconstructed order is inherent in existing theory. 7
Subsequent sections of the Article examine the liberal con-
cern with the structure of constitutional power to demonstrate,
once again, a false vision. The debate surrounding the interpre-
tive vision of Ronald Dworkin is highlighted. Dworkin has placed
a great deal of emphasis on a doctrine of inherent meaning and
constraint to justify and limit judicial review. In developing his
view, he has emphasized current developments in literary theory.
The fallacy of this doctrine of inherent constraint will be con-
trasted with another vision of literary theory, one based on a doc-
trine of community-based, historically contingent meaning.
Finally, the idea of community upon which the critique of lib-
eral interpretivism is based is used as a key to understanding the
strength and weakness of critical legal scholarship. A call is made
for the revival of the idea of a redeemed community in which real
7. While hermeneutics, particularly in its liberating manifestation, is potentially pre-
sent in liberal theory, it maintains its subversive independence and non-hierarchical struc-
ture. As Richard Rorty says, "[h]ermeneutics sees the relations between various discourses
as those of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which presupposes no discipli-
nary matrix which unites the speakers, but where the hope of agreement is never lost so
long as the conversation lasts." R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 318
(1979). "Immanent critique" is a form of theory and practice which recognizes the utopian
vision of certain values of liberalism. The emancipatory vision of immanent critique seeks
to extend the utopian elements found in liberal theory to their logical conclusions. Thus,
immanent critique combines an emancipatory vision of humanity with a criticism whose
weapons are borrowed from the theory being criticized. In many of its manifestations, it is
internal rather than external. See Casanova, Book Review, 15 Trios 187, 189-90 (1984) (re-
viewing J. COHEN, CLASS AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE Lirrs OF MARXIAN CRITICAL THEORY
(1982)).
732 [Vol. 33
TRUTH AND HIERARCHY
open debate about truth and value will bepossible. Refusal or re-
luctance by critical scholars to focus on the task of realizing a sec-
ular redemption of the political community has resulted in a fun-
damental weakness of progressive theory. The final sections of the
Article hopefully will serve, at least, to re-focus our energies to
this constructive end.
I. DECONSTRUCTING THE HIERARCHY
A. After Passive Virtue: Alexander Bickel's Vision
On May 31, 1983, the Supreme Court denied petitions for
writs of certiorari in McCray v. New York, Miller v. Illinois and Perry
v. Louisiana.8 These cases questioned the constitutional validity of
the use of the peremptory challenge by prosecutors to "exclude
members of a particular group" (i.e., blacks) from criminal juries.
The Court refused, in effect, to reconsider its 1965 decision in
Swain v. Alabama.9 Justices Marshall and Brennan insisted that the
time for such a reconsideration was ripe, but Justices Stevens,
Blackmun and Powell, after noting that two state courts had
struck down on state constitutional grounds such use of the pe-
remptory challenge,10 concluded that "further consideration of
the substantive and procedural ramifications of the problem by
other courts will enable us to deal with the issue more wisely at a
later date.""1 The prevailing justices seemed to assume that the
role of the state courts is to serve as laboratories for the Supreme
Court. They did not seek to abdicate the Court's responsibility.
Rather, they disclaimed sufficient knowledge upon which to form
a valid decision. Informed judgment, they claimed, required fur-
ther information which could be obtained only in the state courts.
The majority owes its principal intellectual debt to Alexander
Bickel and his "passive virtues."" In his influential article, Bickel
called for greater circumspection by the Court in constitutional
adjudication. In particular, he invited the Court to use the denial
8. 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1983).
9. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
10. See Commonwealth of Pa. v. Green, 316 Pa. Super. 608, 467 A.2d 1346 (1983).
11. 103 S. Ct. at 2438 (1983).
12. See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 40 (1961). Contra Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues-A Comment on
Principle and Expedieny inJudicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
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of certiorari as a weap6n to preserve the sanctity of the adjudica-
tory process. His goal, one based on structural institutional con-
cerns, was to insure that the Court would deal only with truly im-
portant issues."a But not deciding is deciding. The debate into
which Bickel entered, although couched in the language of struc-
ture, is one of values: which cases, which "rights," are worthy of
the Court's attention and of possible inclusion in the constitu-
tional fabric?
Such a statement, at one level, would come as little surprise to
Bickel. For him, the function of the Court-that is, the role of
constitutional adjudication-was to initiate dia-
logue-"conversations between the Court and the people and
their representatives. 1 1 4 This interpretative (hermeneutic) process
was for Bickel a dialogue of principle. Yet his Burkean"5 perspec-
tive could not allow him to admit that the conversation in which
the Court served as initiator should be one of competing princi-
ples, each supported by rationality and objectivity, and each
grounded in the aspirational goals of the Constitution."6 Rather,
Bickel described the dialogue as involving "principles of different
orders of magnitude and complexity in the[ir] application.' 1
Bickel would argue that there simply are some issues better left
for final decision to the people, or to their representatives in the
legislatures; the grubby, complex realities of political life are be-
yond the grasp of the courts and ill-suited to judicial definition.
Higher, aspirational goals ("the ideal of progress") are within the
realm of the Court. The Court, according to Bickel, must care-
fully choose its cases, deciding only those which permit it to de-
clare the teleological principles of the Constitution. The practical
consequences must be left to the "people."
Thus, Bickel quickly shifts from truth to hierarchy. This shift
reveals the fallacy of his theory. By changing the' level at which
13. That many minor cases may impose major individual hardships does not escape
Bickel's attention. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 50-54
(1970).
14. Id. at 91. For another, more recent example of liberalism's limited and limiting
use of the concept of "conversation," see B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE (1980).
15. For an overview of the anti-progressivistic philosophy of Edmund Burke, see C.
CONE. BURKE AND THE NATURE OF POLITICS (1957).
16. Illustrative of this point is A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
17. A. BICKEL, supra note 13, at 177.
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the dialogue, or hermeneutic process, operates, he effectively
neuters its liberating potential. Instead of allowing concern to lie
principally with the concrete values involved in each case, and
thus permitting an open and full discussion of these values, he
falls back to argue about the institutional legitimacy of the process
of judicial review. The discussion of ends is placed to one side and
quickly forgotten while energy is expended on an isolated and
largely unimportant concern with means.
This Bickelian concept of dialogue, with its necessary compo-
nent of majoritarian approval through a graduated progress, has,
like all great ideas, spawned progeny. Most interesting of these is
Professor Charles Black's proposal that the Constitution may pro-
vide, in certain cases, a right to current niajoritarian review.18 Ac-
cording to Professor Black, while a citizen may not have a right to
a particular substantive result, he 9 does have the right to pro-
cess-in this case, current majoritarian process.
Such a theory, an almost inevitable result of Bickel's idea of
the majoritarian/countermajoritarian dialogue, does offer a useful
insight by proposing a theoretical explanation for at least two se-
ries of Supreme Court cases which have aroused a great deal of
commentary and controversy. The first involves the constitution-
ality of the death penalty. The second (which, for the sake of
brevity, will be referred to as "the Communist cases") involves the
extent to which the Constitution protects the members of radical
political groups. Evident in the cases of both these categories, as
18. This idea is set forth in two footnotes by Guido Calabresi. See G. CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATuTFS 201 n.43, 266 n.99 (1982). An intriguing example
of this theory in action can be found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Parliament may, by invoking a "notwithstanding" clause, override certain constitutionally
guaranteed "fundamental freedoms" and "legal rights." CAN. CHARTER RrS. & FREEDOMS §
33(1). For an enumeration of these fundamental guarantees, see id. §§ 2, 7-15. Such a
legislative override can be effective for a maximum of five years: "A declaration ... shall
cease to have effect five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be
specified in the declaration." Id. § 33(3). The overriding declaration may be re-enacted
every five years, and the number of re-enactments permitted is limitless. See id. § 33(4), (5).
Thus, Canadians are entitled to reasonably contemporaneous majoritarian review of legis-
lation which abridges constitutional guarantees, but they are not entitled to a substantive
outcome. It remains to be seen whether the use of the section 33 override will be reactive
or pre-emptive-that is, whether Parliament will use this power to overrule particular
court decisions or to preclude judicial review.
19. The use of the masculine pronoun is intentional. Traditional liberal concern with
majoritarianism has suffered not only from the problems of properly defining "majority,"
but also from the difficulty of grappling with different "process" for, men and women.
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well as in both the majority and dissenting opinions in the pe-
remptory-challenge case (McCray), is a concept which is central to
an understanding of the Bickel-Black theories of constitutional ad-
judication: that of the fringes of constitutionality, the constitu-
tional border line.
All legal decisions (constitutional or otherwise) involve value
disputes. At the constitutional level, reasonable persons may differ
as to which "interpretation," which finding of a fundamental
value is "correct." Each side attempts to convince the Court that
its interpretation embodies the truth.0 But not every issue de-
cided by the Court provokes equal controversy. Some values,
when confirmed by the Court, obtain, as a practical matter, wide-
spread support in the "community. 21 Others are not as readily
accepted. Debate continues, often inflamed by the Court's deci-
sion. The Court is often brutally criticized by supporters of the
losing cause.
There are other decisions which are grayer than either ex-
treme. Both the death penalty and Communist cases fit into this
twilight area of the constitutional landscape, the area on the
fringes of constitutionality.
Opinions on the constitutional permissibility of the death pen-
alty differ radically; some believe that it is always unconstitutional,
others that it is perfectly constitutional, still others that it is consti-
tutional or unconstitutional as applied. Indeed, the fundamental
values of the liberal democratic society are starkly confronted
when the issue becomes that of the state-sanctioned taking of
human life. One explanation of the Court's decision in Furman v.
Georgia22 is that at least some of the members of the Court felt
that the death penalty was an issue which had come into conflict
with the evolving values of our society. By framing the decision as
it did, the Court expressed the ideal/aspiration that society had
developed to such a state that the death penalty would become a
relic of the past. Legislative reaction to Furman quickly disabused
20. Since, in the view of the Court and of traditional liberal scholars, truth is "objec-
tive," losers in the adversarial process are stigmatized, implicitly or otherwise, as "Ii-
ars"-that is, as persons who have adopted positions embodying "untruth."
21. The difficulty inherent in such a bold statement about the existence of community
is recognized, and its use is attacked below. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. It
is used here as a part of common discourse without ontological or epistemological support.
22. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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the Court of any such notion. By 1976, when Gregg v. Georgia3
was decided, at least thirty-five states had reacted to Furman by re-
introducing death penalty legislation. The dialogue initiated by
the Court in Furman had been brought to a "conclusive" end by
current majoritarian (i.e., legislative) rejection of the Court's
vision.
The Communist cases 4 are in a similar vein. Viewed as an
abstract political-legal question, the outlawing of a particular po-
litical party poses serious questions of first amendment freedoms.
Ill-defined as they are, the liberties guaranteed by the first amend-
ment have held, and continued to hold, a particular place in the
dominant mythology. But the Smith Act 25 (and the entire family
of provisions which preceeded and followed it) was not seen as
such an abstract question. In Dennis v. United States,26 the Court
came face to face with the ugly hysteria of McCarthyism and
"The Red Menace." In that case, the leaders of the Communist
Party of the United States were charged under the Smith Act with
conspiring to advocate the violent overthrow of the government.
The Court was faced with a piece of legislation passed overwhelm-
ingly by Congress in response to a clearly (if mistakenly) perceived
threat to the very existence of the nation. The Dennis opinion was
written by Justice Frankfurter, and it reflects most 'clearly the
practical manifestation of the Bickelian 27 world view.
It is not for us to decide how we would adjust the clash of interests
which this case presents were the primary responsibility for reconciling it
ours. Congress has determined that the danger created by advocacy of over-
throw justifies the ensuing restriction of freedom of speech. The determina-
tion was made after due deliberation, and the seriousness of the congres-
sional purpose is attested by the volume of legislation passed to effectuate
23. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). "Of course, the requirements of the Eighth Amendment
must be applied with an awareness of the limited role to be played by the courts." Id. at
174.
24. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 176 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1950).
25. Smith Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2385, 2387 (1982)).
26. 341 U.S. 494 (1950).
27. It is no accident that in The Supreme Court and the Ideal of Progress, Bickel por-
trayed (though not uncritically) Justice Frankfurter as the paradigm of judicial reasoning.
See A. BICKEL, supra note 13, at 29.
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the same ends."
The protection of the nation in the Frankfurtarian-Bickelian
universe is left to Congress. It is a principle about which dialogue
is unnecessary. Fact replaces conversation.
The Smith Act and its relatives remained nonetheless on the
fringes of constitutionality. 29 One cannot help but sense, particu-
larly in Greene v. McElroy30 and Kent v. Dulles,31 the regret felt by
the Court over its complicity in outlawing a political party. While
it did not have the desire or the courage to overturn Dennis ex-
plicitly, in subsequent cases, the Court struck down related admin-
istrative decisions and congressional contempt powers. The Court
invoked constitutional concepts of a structural nature which are
central to the Bickelian tradition. We sense in Kent the accuracy
of Professor Black's notion of a right to current majoritarian re-
view without a substantively guaranteed result. The refusal of the
Secretary of State to issue a passport was not per se unconstitu-
tional. Rather, the authority to do so had to be accorded specifi-
cally by Congress. The plaintiff had no right to a passport, but he
did have a right to have it refused (or issued) on standards directly
proposed by the elected majoritarian branch of government. In
Greene, the Court struck down the revocation of a security clear-
ance because the regulation under which it had taken place had
not been explicitly authorized by either the President or the Con-
gress. 2 Pending reconsideration of the entire Frankfurtarian leg-
acy and a reversal of Dennis, the Court could not seek to invali-
date such actions on strict first amendment grounds. While the
plaintiff in each case had no substantive right to exercise his first
amendment interest, he did have, according to one view of the
Court's position, a right to current majoritarian (i.e., legislative or
executive) review.
Cases like Kent and Greene suggest that the Court desired a
continuation of the constitutional conversation. Regretting its
"good bye" in Dennis, the Court sought to reinstate its position as
partner in a continuing colloquy. It knew that it had too hastily
defined the order and magnitude of the principles and functions
28. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 550-51.
29. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 97-160 (1970).
30. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
31. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
32. 360 U.S. at 508.
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in question. 33 Perhaps Professor Emerson was correct when he
stated that the Court, "having traversed its winding route and
[having] had the opportunity to elucidate itself and the nation,
• ..now [has] reached the place where it is ready to face the is-
sues fully and without unnecessary caution. 34
In both the death penalty and Communist cases the debate
remains centered where it continues to perplex commentators
who seek to justify judicial review. The emphasis of both Bickel's
and Black's commentary continues to be "functional": they see
the ephemeral boundary between democratic tyranny (majoritari-
anism) and anti-democratic tyranny (countermajoritarianism). For
a Burkean such as Bickel, this position is not surprising. Nor is
Professor Black's theory shocking; by his own admission, he is
greatly concerned with structure and function in constitutional
law. 5
But Professor Black is not concerned solely with these issues,
and his theory of current majoritarian review as a procedural
right must not be assessed without noting his positions on related
issues. His record in defense of the rights of blacks and his stance
on the death penalty38 speak for themselves. In at least one in-
stance, he argued that the most "majoritarian" of all methods, the
popular referendum, should not be used to deprive blacks of their
substantive right of access to the political process.3 7
Black's views can best be understood in the context provided
by Reitman v. Mulkey."8 In that case, the California legislature had
passed several statutes effectively banning racial discrimination in
housing. By initiative and referendum, the voters approved Pro-
position 14, which amended the state constitution to provide:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit
or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or
33. This does not mean the victory was assured for those attacking government ac-
tion. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
34. T. EMERSON, supra note 29, at 160.
35. E.g., C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
36. See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT-THE INEvITABILrrY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE
(2d ed. 1981).
37. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,
and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69 (1967).
Certain scholars, such as Guido Calabresi, argue that referenda can be used to cheapen
constitutional values. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 18, at 12, 69.
38. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to
sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons he, in his absolute
discretion, chooses.39
The Court successfully overcame certain obstacles 0 to the judicial
invalidation of such a negatively worded amendment. But the
Court's motivation for striking down the provision surely had less
to do with fundamental grammar than with a mistrust of naked
majoritarianism. Justice Douglas, concurring, offered this charac-
terization: "Proposition 14 is a form of sophisticated discrimina-
tion whereby the people of California harness the energies of pri-
vate groups to do indirectly what they cannot under our decisions
allow their government to do." 41
The reason for objecting to such raw majoritarianism as re-
flected by referenda is put succinctly by Professor Black: "What is
carved out, . . . constitutionalized, and so put beyond ordinary
political attack, is a small area, absolutely vital so far as racial dis-
crimination is concerned but of rather uncertain importance
otherwise. "42
According to Black, then, current majoritarian review is ei-
ther a preliminary or an ex post facto protection. It may be in-
voked in one of two ways. If an administrative or executive deci-
sion has not achieved current legislative approval, it violates basic
structural or hierarchical principles and can be struck down.43 If,
on the other hand, a practice or statute approaches the fringes of
unconstitutionality, a court may simply strike it down because the
plaintiff has not been granted the necessary procedural guarantee
of current consideration by a majoritarian body.4 Even current
review, which would satisfy this procedural requirement, does not
preclude substantive reversal. If the right is important enough
(under an as yet undetermined standard), a court may or must act
to grant substantive protection.45 Thus, while the California
amendment had been subjected to the most direct, most
majoritarian of reviews-the popular referendum-the Court was
39. CAL CONSr. art. I, § 26 (1964, repealed 1974). See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 371.
40. The primary obstacle was the difficulty of characterizing such wording as "state
action." Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374-76.
41. Reitman, 387 U.S. at 383 (footnotes omitted).
42. Black, supra note 37, at 80.
43. See Greene, 360 U.S. at 474.
44. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 238.
45. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 369.
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not precluded from stepping in to enforce the higher values in-
herent in the Constitution.
Yet even Professor Black's view of substantive rights is inex-
tricably bound up with structure. For him, as for Ely,46 some acts
of current review cannot stand because they are "structurally" un-
sound. They foreclose participation in the political process. Blacks
are excluded from a proper place in the socio-political (and consti-
tutional) dialogue because the "ordinary political processes '7 are
closed to them. Majoritarian review, current or otherwise, direct
or mediated, cannot be allowed to pervert the political process.
This theory of judicial review seeks to open up the conversation
of American society, but appears unwilling to offer an opinion as
to the substance of the discussion.
Democracy, or a particular view of American democracy, de-
mands deference and dialogue not to and with "the people" but
rather with the legislative branch of government. Majoritarianism,
naked and uncivilized, must be tamed and mediated through the
electoral process. The debate over judicial review in constitutional
law does not involve the people but two (perhaps three) branches
of government, each of which speaks for and to the people. Such
''colloquy" or "conversation" between the government and the
people is at once the strength and weakness of Bickelian language.
It offers a vision of the free exchange of ideas, discussions be-
tween civilized beings concerning matters of fundamental impor-
tance, a national dialogue in search of truth. Such language is
misleading.
The debate remains dangerously limited. The underlying val-
ues which Bickel attempts to preserve are those of process. His
concern is with structure. The colloquy which takes place in this
limited world is one between courts and legislatures. The norma-
tive context must take second place because the important ques-
tion, the one which must be solved if we are to remain a viable
and justifiable democracy, is the validity of the process of judicial
review.
If we are to maintain our "democratic" traditions, we must
require all branches of government, majoritarian and otherwise,
as we must require all citizens, to discuss and define the content of
46. See generally J.H. ELY, supra note 1.
47. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 369.
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our normative universe. Authority must come not from considera-
tions of hierarchy but from considerations of value.4
B. The False Hermeneutics of Majoritarianism
Concern with structure is not without importance. 4 Demo-
cratic government may require certain hierarchical arrangements.
Indeed, the Constitution itself is concerned primarily with such
arrangements. The values-whatever they may turn out to
be-embodied in the Bill of Rights, are, to a certain extent, an
historical afterthought.50
While structure is important, a preoccupation with it is
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for democratic flour-
ishing. Beneath the sometimes impermeable mythology of form,
process, and structure hides substance.51 We are defined as human
beings by the substantive content which we give to our lives. 2 As
citizens, we are defined, to a large extent, by the substantive con-
tent of our collective existence. The discussions of most constitu-
tional scholars who have attempted to find justifications for judi-
cial review have failed to grasp this fundamental point.53 The
decency and worth of the nation must be assessed by an examina-
tion of the "truth" of its values, not by a superficial examination
of its method."
Concern with proper deference to majoritarian branches of
government manages to block and mask inquiry into the norma-
48. See Mansbridge, Living with Conflict: Representation in the Theory of Adversary Democ-
racy, 91 EmIcs 466 (1981).
49. Structure is often vitally important, but only when it relates to and facilitates
goals. See K. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974); G. CALABRESI & P. BoBnirr,
TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); 0. WILUAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES (1975). Nor is "struc-
turalism" without its uses in the development of a valid hermeneutics. See, e.g., P. RICOEUR,
THE CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS 30 (1974). For trenchant criticisms and analyses of the
limits of structuralist thought, see F. JAMESON, THE PRISON-HOUSE OF LANGUAGE (1972); R.
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLIrIcs 132 (1975).
50. See generally C. BLACK, supra note 35.
51. See J. DERRIDA, Force and Signification, in WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 3 '(1978).
52. See J.P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (1943).
53. Arguments about substantive rights are not totally absent from these discussions.
See Tribe, The-Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063
(1980). But cf. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694 (1980).
54. This distinction is essential to an understanding of the school of hermeneutic phi-
losophy developed by Gadamer. See H. GADAMER, supra note 4; R. RORTY, supra note 7, at
357. Truth does not mean objective, ordained, or natural truth. Rather, it is historical and
highly political. Truth is fundamentally a matter of belief.
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tive content of our existence. It equates value with structure. The
simple fact that a majority has declared some value or faith wor-
thy of legal sanctification determines the goodness of that faith.5
Such a position fundamentally undermines the hermeneutics
through which we must search for the values of our society.
Human existence and the values which it can, indeed must, em-
body are infinite.56 We cannot hope to discover these values if we
are to limit our definitive and authoritative dialogue to two (or
three) branches of government, one of which, hierarchically, has
ultimate authority. 7
The closed nature of the inquiry which involves as its key
component deference to the majoritarian branches is obvious. Not
only does it involve an incredibly narrow version of the human
condition, but it crucially misinterprets the present nature of
American government. That simple majoritarian government was
ever meant to be the essential part of American democracy is, of
course, doubtful. The delicate system of checks and balances
which is essential to the structure of the constitutional arrange-
ment belies any attempt to declare majoritarianism as the gov-
erning principle. Even on their own terms, traditional theories of
judicial review must fail.
Whether there has ever been, or can ever be, a "majority" is
an equally important question. Professor Dahl, for instance, ar-
55. Brevity requires such a generalization. At one level, it is possible to argue that
truth can be found only within a structure. According to such a theory, truth is associated
with winning and winning is determined and defined only within the system of our govern-
ment and community. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THis CLAss? 338 (1980). The argu-
ment here is at a different level. Truth is political and is therefore reflected in power. This
does not mean that the mere dictates of a particular body are imbued with objective validity,
nor that they must be blindly accepted. Debate is never foreclosed as long as there are
believers.
56. We owe much of this insight to Heidegger, see M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME
(1962), and to Gadamer's elucidation and broadening of a theory of the hermeneutical
experience. See H. GADAMER, supra note 4, at 153-447. The key concept here is that of the
hermeneutic circle:
The main point of the hermeneutics of facticity and its contrast with the tran-
scendental constitution research of Husserl's phenomenology was that no freely
chosen relation toward one's own being can go back beyond the facticity of this
being. Everything that makes possible and limits the project of There-being
precedes it, absolutely.
Id. at 234.
57. Some of the problems of such a hermeneutics of jurisdiction are uniquely dealt
with by Professor Cover. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 53 (1983).
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gues rather persuasively that America has been governed by an
ever fluid coalition of minorities. 8 Indeed, the existence of such
doubts about the majoritarian nature of the elected branches of
government is what gives particular weight to such process-based
theories of judicial review as that of ElyY9 The exclusion, both
voluntary and involuntary, of large segments of the American
population from official participation in the electoral process
makes dubious the existence of even a de facto majoritarianism.
A more important difficulty, of concern both in practice and
in principle, is the very determination of majority status. Illustra-
tive of this difficulty is the conflict with which the Court was con-
fronted in the Bob Jones University6" case. The case can be fairly
described as a test of Ronald Reagan's commitment to the "moral
majority,"6 " which was given much of the credit for Reagan's vic-
tory.2 In return for the group's support, Reagan vowed to foster
a reaffirmation of Christian principles in American politics and in-
stitutions. One of his first opportunities to do so arose from the
controversy surrounding the IRS's decision to terminate the tax-
exempt charitable organization status of Bob Jones University, a
religious school with strict prohibitions (based on Biblical inter-
pretation) of inter-racial dating and miscegenation. The legal issue
in the case was the validity of the IRS's action under the relevant
statute. But in the eyes of the public, the case presented a con-
frontation between those who viewed the exemption as state-subsi-
dized racial segregation and those who felt that the denial of the
exemption inhibited the free exercise of religion. Both sides of
58. R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT
(1967); R_ DAH, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
59. See generally ELY, supra note 1. See also Cover, Origins of Judicial Activism in the
Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287 (1982).
60. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983).
61. This term is used to describe a group of people including not just those in the
"congregation" of Reverend Falwell which carries the name, but rather all proponents of a
particular world view characterized by conservative politics and a deeply felt, fundamental-
ist Christian faith.
62. Through the use of sophisticated, computer-based mail solicitation and organizing
techniques, the group "targeted" several high-profile members of Congress for defeat and
lent a great deal of financial, physical, and moral support to the Reagan campaign. The
chief determinants of the group's support were a candidate's views on abortion and school
prayer. The group's success was not limited to the Reagan victory. See,'e.g., Stempel &
Morris, Electoral Folklore: An Empirical Examination of the Abortion Issue, I YALE L. & PoL'Y
REV. 1 (1982).
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the confrontation, of course, reflected "majority" values. The sit-
uation thus presented a classic dilemma of majoritarianism: which
"majority's" claim to majority status is to be believed? Should au-
thority be given to a short-term, recent majority, able to use the
rules of the mass media and electoral politics to gain an upper
hand on a longer-term majority, one for whom there is "a firm
national policy to prohibit racial segregation in public educa-
tion"?"5 The appearance on behalf of the university of the Assis-
tant Attorney General for Civil Rights suggests the hollowness of
the Administration's claim to majoritarianism, particularly in the
perception of the unregistered voters of the urban ghettoes and
the rural south.
C. The Sanctuary of Ronald Dworkin-For Priests Only
Objections to process-based theories are themselves basically
process-based. We must avoid this dialectical cul-de-sac by insist-
ing upon a discussion of values. The emphasis placed by Ely and
others on structural justifications of judicial review subverts the
open-textured nature of human society." What such appeals do is
vest authority in a given interpreter or interpretive community65
occupying a position of supposed hierarchical superiority. We
shall be unable to escape from this structural enclosure to a dis-
cussion of telos unless we overthrow the tyranny of interpretive
hierarchy. By seeking greater hermeneutic flexibility, hierarchy
will be replaced by democracy. Only if we are able to establish a
popular democratic community of interpretive interest will we be
in a position of hermeneutic opening. At present, the law and the
legal system in general cannot pretend to represent the demo-
cratic, open community which will show the broader public the
way to such interpretive freedom."6 Rather, law continues to per-
63. Bob Jones Univ., 103 S. Ct. at 2029.
64. See, e.g., J.H. ELY, supra note 1.
65. See generally S. FISH, supra note 55.
66. In a recent article, Feher and Heller examine the dual goals of freedom and life in
the context of social movements such as Critical Legal Studies. See Feher & Heller, From
Red to Green, 15 TELoS 55 (1984). Our viability as a social movement depends upon our
ability to reinforce these two primary values by an aggressive attack on normality. Accord-
ing to their thesis, social movements in the 1960's were primarily concerned with freedom
("sex and drugs and rock 'n' roll"), while those of the 1970's and 1980's have concentrated
on life (avoiding nuclear disaster, saving whales). For Feher and Heller, the two goals are
not mutually exclusive, but rather are mutually dependent. The criterion by which the left
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petuate and reinforce hierarchy.
We must acknowledge that we, as lawyers and as citizens,
have managed to establish constitutionalism as a new religious
faith. Lawyers, both in the practice of private law and at the level
of constitutional interpretation, have adopted many of the charac-
teristics of a mystical priesthood.6 7 Sources of law-the Congress
and the Constitution-take on sacred qualities by the force of
their existence. It is heresy to go beyond the text. There is no
other law.
Our public personnae and some of our personal beliefs con-
tinue to be professedly deontological. We continue to maintain
that there are findable values and knowable, objective truths. And
we know exactly where to look for them. The sources of law (and
therefore of value and truth) are limited: Congress and the Con-
stitution. 8 We look for truth in sacred text and hierarchy.
The position adopted by Ronald Dworkin is instructive."9 It is
also reflective of the inherent fallacy of liberalism. Truth, for
Dworkin, is found in process.7 There is an ordering of values just
as there is an ordering of authority. For him, hard cases do not
really exist; there is just a difference between policy and principle.
Policy is to be left to the rough and tumble of the political pro-
cess; principle, to adjudication. Principle forces judges to yield to
policy-that is, they must obey the clear policy statements of the
legislators. Of course, principle also commands that they limit
those policies to their most narrow acceptable areas of
must judge each movement is whether it can "generate new norms of discursive rational-
ity." Id. at 43. The approach to all social movements is therefore hermeneutic. Freedom
and life are the values which movements seek to crystalize. They can succeed only by chal-
lenging existing normality. Id. The exact practical content of these values, however, re-
mains highly problematic.
67. See F. RODELL, WOE UNTO You, LAWYERS! (1939).
68. For present purposes, the problem of sources of non-constitutional (common) law
shall be ignored.
69. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); Dworkin, Law as Interpretation,
9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179 (1979), reprinted in 60 Tax. L. Rav. 527 (1982).
70. This is true of only one level of Dworkin's argument. He does adopt a position
that there is a primary value-the equality principle-which must always be chosen. To a
certain extent, then, he superimposes process constraints, particularly stare decisis, on his
deontological model in order to confirm and maintain it. One reason judges cannot ven-
ture out on their own is that it would be a violation of the principle of equality to do so.
For a recent criticism of this part of Dworkin's theory, see Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism
and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1103, 1127 (1983).
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application."1
Dworkin does not maintain that principle, or substance, runs
wild. Limits are placed on principle (i.e., on judges) by structure.
Not only must judges officially yield to concerns of hierarchy (i.e.,
to the will of the majoritarian legislature), they also are con-
strained by the very nature of their enterprise: 2 they are limited
by the judges who came before them and by those who will follow.
Like authors or literary critics, judges are "unfree," chained both
by "history" and "future."
Of course, this "unfreedom" is in reality determined not by
strict hierarchy but by social norms. The judges' conceptions are
limited to the normal. They cannot venture out in new directions
unless the directions are "acceptable." We would react to such
"abnormal" jurisprudence by saying: "Judges can't do that."
Interpreters are constrained by their tacit awareness of what is possible and
not possible to do, what is and is not a reasonable thing to say, what will and
will not be heard as evidence, in a given enterprise; and it is within those
same constraints that they see and bring others to see the shape of the docu-
ments to whose interpretation they are committed.7 3
The problem, then, is not one of hierarchy per se but rather
of interpretation as appropriation (normalization). A text or legal
rule is appropriated into a language and a culture where normal-
ity is assumed. Arguments are made not between absurdities but
between two pretenders to normality and hence to validity.74 The
winning position becomes an accepted, and therefore powerful,
part of the culture. Blaming it all on the structural hierarchy of
government is inaccurate and dangerous. The hierarchy itself de-
termines values when it chooses between and among values, not
when it finds the only value. Questioning an interpretation of a
particular priesthood may also cause us to question the whole
dogma of that priesthood. Those whose rules depend upon holy
sanction can little afford demonstrable, human error.
71. See generally R. DwoRmN, supra note 69.
72. See generally Dworkin, supra note 69.
73. Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 9 CRTCAL
INQUIRY 201 (1982), reprinted in 60 Tr.x L. REv. 551 (1982). For the latest salvo in the
Dworkin-Fish debate, see Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEn. L. REv. 299 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Fish, Wrong Again], and Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaes):
Please Don't Talk About Objectivity Any More, in THE PoLmcs or INTERPRETAT-ION 287 (W.J.T.
Mitchell ed. 1983).
74. S. FIsH, supra note 55, at 306.
1984]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
We are expected, indeed required, to follow the articles of
faith as declared by structure. Bickel, Black, and Dworkin, each in
his own variant of the vision, would have us bow to structure. In-
stitutionalized declarations are offered as truth, to be obeyed un-
thinkingly and without criticism. Hierarchy, for the liberal, takes
on totemic power. Liberalism offers us the false god of structure.
II. ON DISCOVERING THE SOURCES OF TRUTH
These are familiar criticisms, so familiar that they seem apho-
ristic. Yet, despite these and similar criticisms, liberalism has sur-
vived as the preeminent doctrine in American legal scholarship.
The particular strength of liberalism as it is manifested in the
American political system is its ability to bridge the gap between
theory and practice, between vision and reality. More accurately,
it has managed to achieve acceptance as the dominant myth of
American life. As Professor Cover notes: "If law reflects a tension
between what is and what might be, law can be maintained only as
long as the two are close enough to reveal a line of human en-
deavour that brings them into temporary or partial
reconciliation."7 5
The ability of the American legal system to deal with funda-
mental conflicts in a "legalistic" way also is remarkable. Resort to
overt violence and domination have not been necessary (since the
Civil War, at least) to maintain and sustain American society.
There are, of course, more subtle forms of violence. As
Cover and Burt"8 point out, exclusion is violence. Legally but-
tressed attacks on "discrete and insular minorities" smack of bru-
tality. The exclusion of those who believe that abortion is murder
from the mainstream of the American legal system cannot help
but inflict heavy "process costs"'77 upon them. Their values find
no currency in the American realm; they cannot participate in the
hermeneutic conversation, in the construction of the system of
constitutional values.
For many years, legal scholars have attempted to develop a
theoretical construct which will ensure "liberty and justice for all"
75. See Cover, supra note 57, at 39.
76. See Cover, supra note 57; Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables,
93 YALE Lj. 455 (1984).
77. G. CALABRESI & P. BOBBrr-, TRAGIC CHOICES 53-79 (1978).
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within totalizing hermeneutics. These attempts are well known
and have achieved varying degrees of acceptance. They have also
received greater and lesser degrees of strident attack, first from
the exquisite technical armory of the legal realists and then from
the self-proclaimed inheritors of the realist tradition, the critical
legal scholars.78 I shall leave criticism of the merits of liberalism to
others.7 Criticism from the left is my primary focus.
The left, as I have already mentioned, has yet. to come to
grips with the power of liberalism. While critical attacks on the
existing basis of Western society have an apparent internal consis-
tency and offer valid insights into the weakness of liberal theory,
they have yet to offer a valid alternative. 0 This failure exists at
two levels. The left has not managed to develop a coherent pro-
cess which would permit both accurate criticism and concrete im-
plementation of counter-proposals. Because the process has not
been outlined, the second failure of the left is obvious: it offers no
practical alternative to our lives as they now are. Any concrete
proposal about values must fail because it will inevitably be la-
belled as impractical and utopian. The remainder of this Article
attempts to remedy this problem.
Leftist criticism of liberalism is not limited to the realm of
legal scholarship. Both literary criticism and philosophy have
"critical" movements."' Can we, as lawyers, learn from these disci-
78. Roberto Unger and Mark Tushnet shall be assumed to be representative of the
area under study. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLrrIcs (1975); Tushnet, supra
note 1; Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of Public Law Scholar-
ship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1307 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Tushnet, Truth, Jus-
tice, and the American Way]; Tushnet, Legal Realism, Structural Review, and Prophecy, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 809 (1983); Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions ofJohn
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies
Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1983).
79. See Shiffrin, supra note 70.
80. As one participant in Stanford Law Review's recent symposium on critical legal stud-
ies put it: "Critical legal writing systematically evades the question, 'Compared to what?'"
Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 STAN. L. REV. 247, 260 (1984).
81. See supra note 3. See generally H. BLOOM, A MAP OF MISREADING (1975); J. DERRIDA,
supra note 48; S. FISH, supra note 61; F. JAMESON, MARXISM AND FORM (1974); J. KRISTEVA,
DESIRE IN LANGUAGE (1980); H. MARCUSE, AN ESSAY ON LIBERATION (1969).
Recent developments, particularly those in literary theory, must not be accepted un-
thinkingly. Like all American social theory, left literary criticism suffers from the lack of a
coherent (grand or otherwise) Marxist framework. Attempts such as Jameson's
"diachronic" and "synchronic" hermeneutics fail to draw a convincing line between Marx-
ism and wishful thinking. For the limits of this approach, see P. RICOEUR, supra note 49.
Moreover, there is a disillusioning realization that literary critics function within and be-
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plines? The hermeneutic philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer82
and the literary deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida83 may be
particularly useful. Moreover, reflections on recent areas of inter-
est in literary theory-canonization and the role of original in-
tent-may demonstrate the value of such interdisciplinary study
as a propaedeutic for effective legal criticism.
A. Unmasking the Holy Text-Deconstructing the Constitution
The process of the canonization of texts, to a certain extent,
presents less epistemological difficulty for legalists than for stu-
dents of literature. The primary canon, the sacred text of legal
scholarship, is the Constitution; it is readily available. Like the
Talmud or the Bible, it remains the authoritative text. But recog-
nition of canonical quality is only the first step. There may, for
example, be other canonical texts which must be invoked in order
to grasp the full ontological fabric."' Meaning may be obfuscated
either in the primary text or by the very existence of a multitude
of secondary texts. For lawyers, the recognition of the "second-
ary" interpretive texts may present problems which are particu-
larly acute: Which of the great scholars and judges are to be given
what degree of authority? What of equal, apparently contradic-
tory, authority? Who shall constitute the primary, authoritative in-
terpretive community?
Many of us, while willing to accept the analogy to religious
scholarship, refuse to take the final step. We question the divine
authority of the primary canon. We must have a living constitu-
tion, a text with mythical characteristics able to deal with practical
come part of, the system which they strive to reject. See E. SAID, THE WORLD, THE TEXT AND
THE CRITIC 166-77 (1983).
82. See generally H. GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE (1982) [hereinafter cited
as H. GADAMER, REAsON]; H. GADAMER, supra note 4; H. GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERME-
NEUTICS (1972) [hereinafter cited as H. GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS].
83. See generally J. DERRIDA, supra note 51; J. DERRIDA, supra note 5.
84. Concern with sources continues to be a popular area of discussion in diverse legal
communities. See Perelman, Juridical Ontology and Sources of Law, 10 N. Ky. L. REV. 387
(1983); "Sources" du droit, 27 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 1 (1982). Of particular
interest is the as yet unresolved debate over language as a source of legal and societal
power. See A. GIULIANI, Nouvelle Rhitorique et Logique du Langage Normatif, in 4 ETUDES DE
- LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE 65 (1970); Goodrich, Rhetoric as Jurisprudence: An Introduction to the
Politics of Language, 4 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 88 (1984). Similiar concerns have been voiced
about "text" as power. See F. NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS (1887); E. SAID,
supra note 81, at 45-46.
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human conflict and frailty; thus arises the debate over "intent of
the framers." Our real doubts regard the "secondary" sources.
The decisions of the great judges-Holmes, Brandeis, Mar-
shall-carry with them certain canonical qualities, yet we do not
wish to carve their wisdom in stone. Stare decisis remains a useful,
but flexible doctrine. 5 These men, 6 after all, suffered from the
frailties of the human condition. They, too, were products of their
age, class, and education.
At this level of doubt, recent literary scholarship becomes im-
portant. We must recognize what we have been doing, at least
subconsciously, during the process of canonization. We have re-
ceived wisdom. We, by the very act of reception, have canonized
the text and shaped the content of the canon. 7 The very act of
accepting to be bound gives value to the text (decision) which we
follow, not because of its intrinsic, ahistorical normative value-
content, but because we, for a multitude of reasons (including our
acceptance of the simple hierarchical values of certainty and con-
tinuity) recognize and declare, more or less openly, that value.
We cannot recognize the unfamiliar. Our recognition of value
is the normalization to the canon.88 We appropriate the past to a
level of present and future hierarchical value. We recapture (and
betray) 9 that past. We defeat history by denying its historical na-
ture, and make the past, for the present, timeless. The survival
"of a text-and. . . its achievement of high canonical status...
-is the product. . . of a series of continuous interactions among
a variably constituted object, emergent conditions, and mecha-
85. For Dworkin, it remains an essential doctrine. See supra note 65.
86. Feminism has taught us that the fact that they are men, at the very least, is an
important factor.
87. Much of the work in hermeneutic philosophy and literary criticism emphasizes the
importance of the reader as changer of the text. See, e.g., J. DERRIDA, supra note 51.
88. Hegelian-Lukacsian philosophy would label this process, especially in law, "reifica-
tion." See Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 REsEARCH L. & Soc. 25 (1980).
89.. "To live, the poet must misinterpret the father, by the crucial act of misprision,
which is the rewriting of the father." H. BLOOM, supra note 81, at 19. This is the problem
of all "constitution" and translation. The project of interpretation and of normalization
involves the translation of language and value from one level of discourse to a higher,
canonized level. Like all translation, it must necessarily involve betrayal. See Calabresi,
Thoughts on the Future of Economics in Legal Education, 33 J. LEGAL EDuQ 359 (1983). "To
translate . . . is to betray. That is the translation, and the betrayal, of an Italian saying:
Traduttore, traditore." Id. at 364. Walter Benjamin, on the other hand, argued that "trans-
latability" is an inherent and essential feature of certain works. See W. BENJAMIN, ILLUMINA-
TIONS (1968).
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nisms of cultural selection and transmission." 90
Regarding judicial review, we give value to a text because,
and only because, it has a place in a hierarchical arrangement. We
grant unto a text canonical stature because it is, in effect, a canon.
We declare the stature not because of the value of the declaration,
but rather out of simple historical contingency (chosen among all
other historical contingencies)-that is, the voice whence comes
the declaration. In other words, we falsify history by placing struc-
ture outside the course of time. When we adopt a liberal view of
the value of majoritarianism or speak in terms of Bickelian collo-
quy, we attempt to falsify the historical evolution of human
thoughts and normativity.9 1 We immortalize structure.
Similar structural problems arise out of legal scholars' at-
tempt to ground "meaning" of the Constitution within or without
the intent of the Framers. The liberal wish to recognize a living,
evolving constitution has lead them to attack those"2 who call for
limiting judicial review to a search for original intent. Scholars
such as Perry3 and Bobbitt 4 seek a justification for a more open
judicial review in the "American ethos." Courts engage in a
search for "a firm national policy" 95 so that they can validate their
function therein. The practical difficulties encountered by those
who call for the search for such an ethos are tremendous. The the-
oretical difficulties of such a position are overwhelming.
The search for a religious analogy is not misplaced. 6 All reli-
gious interpretation is predicated upon an apprehension of God's
90. Smith, Contingencies of Value, 10 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 26 (1983). Religion cannot,
despite its inherent claim to complete transcendence, escape the political nature of the
canonization process. See Bums, Canon and Power in the Hebrew Scriptures, 10 CRMCAL IN-
QUIRY 462 (1984).
91. See Harman, Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty, 12 PHIL. & PUB. ArF. 307 (1983).
Gilbert Harman argues persuasively that these evolving historical norms constitute our
moral universe. "I suggest that the source of morality lies not in the nature of things but in
human arrangements. People come to accept certain rules and values in order to get along
with each other." Id. at 321.
92. E.g., R. BERGER, supra note 1.
93. See generally P. BOBBrrr, supra note 1. For a critique of Bobbitt's work along the
lines developed below, see Michaels, The Fate of the Constitution, 61 TEx. L. REv. 765 (1982).
94. See generally M. PERRY, supra note 1.
95. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2029 (1983). See supra text
accompanying note 63.
96. Gadamer analysed subjectivism and the search for original intent in terms of "di-
vine grace." See H. GADAMER, The Nature of Things and the Language of Things, in HERMENEU-
TICS, supra note 82, at 69-81.
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will/intent as the primary hermeneutic framework. The obvious
difficulties (aside from achieving divine revelation) of finding an
authoritative interpretive community are insurmountable. The Bi-
ble, according to some, condemns homosexuality and even blood
transfusions. Others, relying on the same source, disagree. The
matter necessarily becomes not so much one of objective, rational
authority (i.e., of truth) but rather is "reduced" to be-
lief-textually grounded, but belief nonetheless. The truth of
Biblical interpretation is not epistemologically verifiable.
Similar debates have long been waged in literary circles. Is
authorial intent the key to meaning or is the search for meaning
open to "interpretation"? Recent developments appear to place
the debate at a more constructive level. We must now refocus our
energies. The question is not whether authorial intent is the key
to meaning, but why we engage in the exercise at all. Even if we
are to accept that intent and meaning are found on opposite sides
of the literary (and constitutionalist) equation, we are faced with
the impossibility of discovery. There is no language (or meaning)
before intent.97
Intent does indeed equal meaning. Since there is no theoreti-
cal construct which will enable us to discover the truth, we must
resort to belief. The consequence of such a position leads, its pro-
ponents argue, to the abandonment of theory and the embrace-
ment of practice as the main preoccupation."
Not because theory and practice . . . really are separate but because
theory is nothing else but the attempt to escape practice. Meaning is just
another name for expressed intention, knowledge just another name for
97. For the most provocative exposition of this theory, see Knapp & Michaels, Against
Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723, 724 (1982). See O'Hara, Hirsch, Crewe, Mailloux, Parker,
Rosmarin & Dowling, with reply by Knapp & Michaels, For and Against Theory, CRmCAL
INQUIRY 725 (1983). See also H. GADAMER, PmLOSOPiCAL HERmENEuTics, supra note 96.
Fish also adopts this position, "[b]ut it is precisely my thesis ... that in whatever way one
establishes an interpretation, one will at the same time be assigning an intention." Fish,
Wrong Again, supra note 73, at 314.
98. Compare Marxist theory and praxis with that of its critics. See K MARx, GRUN-
DRISSE DER KRrriK DER POLTiSCHEN OKONOMIE (1859); Gabel & Harris, Building Power and
Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Sor-
CHANGE 369; Gerety, Iron Law: Why Good Lawyers Make Bad Marxists, 26 NoMos 196 (1983).
"In ... hermeneutics, then, theory is subsequent to that out of which it is abstracted; that
is, to praxis." H. GADAMER, On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection, in HEmRE-
NEUTrCs, supra note 82, at 20. Gadamer has expanded on his ideas of the hermeneutic
exercise of practice in his more recent work. See, e.g., H. GADAMER, REASON, supra note 82.
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true belief, but theory is not just another name for practice. It is the name
for all the ways people have tried to stand outside practice in order to gov-
ern practice from without. Our thesis has been that no one can reach a posi-
tion outside practice, that theorists should stop trying, and that the theoreti-
cal enterprise should therefore come to an end."
The practical effects of such a "theory" are, for lawyers, rev-
olutionary. Rather than worry about discovering truth and mean-
ing in semantic textual analysis aided by historical sources, we
must constitute truth and morality in the practice of law-or, bet-
ter still, in the practice of life. Belief encompasses all. Human
flourishing, justice, morality must all be found in the practice of
the human experience. We must develop a practical, sociological
morality. 00
Where are we to find the clues to this sociology? What are the
sources of human experience? Are there canonical texts of societal
desire?
B. Solidarity and Freedom-The Problem of Secular Community
The answer is at once simple, even self-evident, and yet com-
plex. The canonical text of society is society itself. The existence
of life inside and outside community is the text of life. Nonethe-
less, we must choose to stand somewhere-inside or
outside-based on some prima facie belief. We must, because we
99. Knapp &,Michaels, supra note 97, at 741-42. Such statements are indicative of
general malaise in the profession. According to de Man, resistance to theory is inevitable:
Nothing can overcome the resistance to theory since theory is itself this re-
sistance. The loftier the aims and the better the methods of literary theory, the
less possible it becomes. Yet theory is not in danger of going under, it cannot
help but flourish, and the more it is resisted, the more it flourishes, since the
language it speaks is the language of self-resistance. What remains impossible to
decide is whether this flourishing is a triumph or a fall.
de Man, The Resistance to Theory, 63 YALE FRENCH STUD. 3, 20 (1981). See also Fish, Profes-
sion Despise Thyself- Fear and Self-Loathing in Literary Studies, 10 CRMCAL INQUIRY 349
(1983). The work of the realists has lead to a similar crisis in legal theory, a crisis which is
,now manifested by the pessimism of many critical legal scholars. See generally CLS Sympo-
sium, supra note 6.
100. See M. OSSOWSKA, SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF MORAL IDEAS (1972); Harman, supra
note 91. The search for truth then becomes, at the level of praxis, an attempt to convince
others of our beliefs. "Convincing and persuading, without being able to prove-these are
obviously as much the aim and measure of understanding and interpretation as they are
the aim and measure of the art of oration and persuasion." H. GADAMER, On the Scope and
Function of Hermeneutic Reflection, in HERMENEuTICS, supra note 82, at 24.
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are human, view the book of life with a particular prejudice. 1 '
We begin with an attempt to find the proper relation between
individual and community. The human is a political-that is, so-
cial-animal. We live in community. We must examine the texts
of particular, discrete communities in order to develop a larger
hermeneutics of the American and of the human community.10 2
The tension between individual and community presents a
complex dilemma. Closer examination again reveals the fallacy of
attacking it on the theoretical level.103 Individual and community
are unseparated and inseparable. We are the texts which shape us
just as we are the shapers of the texts. Language permits the her-
meneutic dialogue and presupposes understanding. We under-
stand and define both individual and communal existence through
language. We attempt to appropriate our culture and define our
being in the interaction of texts. We normalize and appropriate
the community. 10 4 Our hermeneutics must begin with the lan-
guage of culture, the dialogue of society for which we have no
choice.
I Under this practical framework, we can now question the va-
lidity of the existing hermeneutics. How successful have we been
in incorporating individual and society in practice? What effect
has the externality of part of our existence had on our ability to
101. "Prejudice" here does not necessarily have a negative connotation. Hermeneutic
inquiry demands that we recognize that interpretation is always projection. The interpreter
appropriates the text to her own world experience, her own prejudice. The distinction is
between human authority and hastiness. The interpreter must examine, rather than blindly
accept, her preformed (i.e., historically imposed) judgments. After such study, a prejudice
may be validated. See H. GADAMER, supra note 4, at 235-45.
102. For a discussion of the availability of numerous, non-statist texts to inform the
legal hermeneutics, see Cover, supra note 59.
103. The work of Bakhtin is instructive. See M. BAKHTiN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION
(1983); J. KRISTEVA, Word, Dialogue and Novel, in DESIRE IN LANGUAGE, supra note 81, at 64-
92; Forum on Mikhail Bakhtin, 10 CRITICAL INQUIRY 225 (1983).
104. See Cover, supra note 57 (drive for isolation and the avoidance of social "normali-
zation"). Normality can be avoided by flight to poetic language. Poetry and the
"carnivalesque" permit identity and separateness in isolation. See P. DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND
INSIGHT (2d ed. 1983). While de Man sees poetic language as reflective of a perfect void, a
flight from facticity, Kristeva sees the flight to poetic discourse as an attempt to define "the
constituting struggle of language and society." J. KRISTEVA, The Ethics of Language, in DE-
SIRE IN LANGUAGE, supra note 81, at 34. Similarly, the flight by legalists to abnormal dis-
course is the only way in which we can hope to truly redefine juridical debate and focus our
vision on value. See infra note 130 and accompanying text (Rorty's theory of abnormal
discourse). Like the poet, we must find ourselves "constantly risking absurdity and death."
L. FERLINGHETTI, A CONEY ISLAND OF THE MIND (1958).
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deal with our prejudices, to verify them? What has critical legal
scholarship to offer to replace the fallacies of liberalism?
Problems of inclusion and exclusion have again come to the
fore in legal scholarship. Recent articles by Cover 0 5 and Burt 06
demonstrate the crucial importance of such issues. Each, in his
own way, argues that we can all be excluded unless our hermeneu-
tics permit us to attempt reconciliation of fundamental disagree-
ments. The interpretive framework of authority must permit dis-
cord and appropriation. Community cannot exist without
isolation.107
These insights, with their reliance on the ideal of community,
serve to explain, or to offer a frame of reference with which we
can understand, the underlying premise of critical legal studies.
The movement is characterized and differentiated from legal real-
ism by its belief in, and attempts to justify, collectivism. It seeks to
achieve a state-of human flourishing by placing increased empha-
sis on the possibility of progress only with an increased sense of
collectivity and community. Liberalism must perish because of the
insular individualism which is its self-proclaimed touchstone.108
The liberal vision cannot achieve harmony and advancement of
the human condition in America.
Burt's and Cover's invocations of communitarian arguments
alone do not enable us to understand the critical legal scholars.
The Yale professors' recourse to Biblical and Talmudic sources to
justify the importance of collectivity (or collectivities) does, how-
ever, provide the key. We need only refer to Unger's plea 09 and
Tushnet's clearly stated belief °10 to see-or, more precisely, to be-
lieve-the fundamental premise on which critical legal scholarship
is based: that to achieve a better world, the civil community must
be consecrated. Redemption through community. We must imbue
105. See Cover, supra note 57; Cover, supra note 59.
106. See Burt, supra note 76.
107. See generally Cover, supra note 57.
108. See Tushnet, supra note 1. Cf Fish, Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision, 60 TEX.
L. REV. 495, 505 (1982).
109. "Speak God." R. UNGER, supra note 78, at 295. Parallels between communitarian
(or even Marxist) theory and Christianity have been drawn before. See, e.g., N. BERDYAEV,
THE ORIGIN OF RUSSIAN COMMUNISM (1960).
110. See Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. LJ. 411, 424
(1981).
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civil society with the faith and fervor of religious community.,,
Unger wishes to appropriate the sense of nation which binds reli-
gious groups and invoke its cohesive power in the secular world.
We must believe in the truth of the way. We must be consecrated.
The potential beneficial impact of critical legal studies must be
examined in this light. Can their "belief about belief '112 be valid?
The validity of this belief must be examined from two dis-
tinct, but related, perspectives. First, as a matter of theory, we
must question whether this call to a secularization of the idea of
religious community is consistent with the critical tradition, espe-
cially with its Marxist roots. Second, we must question whether it
is practical-cir rather, whether it is possible. What are the
chances for the implementation of such a new vision in America?
The idea of religion, with its concomitant vision of commu-
nity, is pervasive in Western culture. Not only should the left cap-
ture this ground, it must capture this ground as a theoretical pre-
requisite to any hope of a practical implementation of progressive
ideals. The achievement of a secular community is essential to the
success of the critical project. Religion is the key to this success.
More precisely, the religious experience, and the language of reli-
gious experience, provides valuable insights into the process of de-
mocratizing the hermeneutics, leading to the reconstitution of
civil community. Unger's vision, while inspiring, seems nonethe-
less incomplete, perhaps even paradoxical.
In Knowledge and Politics, published a decade ago, Unger's
theory, with all its liberating vision, falls victim to the trap of hier-
archy and authority: The creation of a secular community is cath-
olic and Catholic. While calling for a total critique and world vi-
sion, Unger's proposal relies in essence on a priesthood. It cannot
be realized without a hierarchical order of individuals who are the
first to see the light of revelation. These are those few individuals
capable of conceptualizing and concretizing Unger's vision of total
critique. From them others will learn and follow. But the first will
111. See Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the American Way, supra note 78.
112.
In our view. . . the only relevant truth about belief is that you can't go outside
it, and, far from being unlivable, this is a truth you can't help but live. It has no
practical consequences not because it can never be united with practice but be-
cause it can never be separated from practice.
Knapp & Michaels, supra note 97, at 741.
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retain their preeminent position; they are the rock upon which
the Church is built.
That such a vision blocks community is obvious. The idea of a
redeemed secular society reverts to the ancient orderings of
priesthood and inherent contradictions to such an extent that it
must fail.
This impressionistic account of Unger would, if accepted,
lead to despair over the possibility of ever forming a new vision of
collective existence. This most persuasive critique of liberalism
would be doomed to failure, and any sense of "we" with it. But
Unger has not abandoned his hope. In Passion: An Essay on Person-
ality, which was published last year, he returned with a vigorous
plea for a renewed attempt to achieve a unity of individuals in a
renewed community. He calls for a new, liberating psychology of
passion to deal with the "problem of solidarity." ' According to
this new version of Ungerian community, faith, love, and hope
will redeem us.
Unlike that of Knowledge and Politics, such a vision is protes-
tant and Protestant. It is clearly a call to protest, an invocation
that we remain open to a larger vision of human potentiality. It is
also a highly Protestant vision of salvation. No longer is the
Church to be built on the rock of an enlightened few. No longer
is hierarchy the door to the path of redemption. The act of conse-
cration becomes an individual one. The way is in the mind-a
new psychology, a willingness to open up before the Other, a deci-
sion of vulnerability.
The parallel with the Protestant vision of the act of personal
acceptance of the Lord is remarkable: The confession of our own
lowly, sinful, individual status as Self; acceptance by the Other;
redemption. Peculiar and personal salvation through union with
113. R_ UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALrTY 20 (1984):
To satisfy our longing for acceptance and recognition, to be intimately assured
that we have a place in the world, and to be freed by this assurance for a life of
action and encounter, we must open ourselves to personal attachments and
communal engagements whose terms we cannot predefine and whose course we
cannot control. Each of these ventures into a life of longing for other people
threatens to create a craven dependence and to submerge our individual selves
under group identities and social roles.
Id. at 20. In other words, community is essential to our existence as individuals, while at
the same time potentially threatening to our very same existence. Passion attempts to
demonstrate how this threat can be successfully encountered and community and individ-
ual both preserved and permitted to flourish.
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God-this is the very root of Protestant theology. The church of
God is made up of individuals, with unique, unmitigated relation-
ships with the godhead. Unger has abandoned the priesthood to
seek salvation in an act of individual contrition. He has left hierar-
chy in search of truth.
The abandonment of hierarchy for truth by one scholar, even
one of Unger's quality, does not finally answer the question of the
validity of a call for a religio-secular revival. Indeed, if it were
conclusive, we would have returned to the ugliest form of hierar-
chy: the cult of personality. Unger's apparent conversion does,
however, give a clear indication of why the return to religiosity is
not evil per se. This indication is to be found in the methodology
of his conversion. A vulnerability is required, an openness to the
Other, to others. It is clearly hermeneutic. Salvation is a goal
achieved through a process which is open and which has as its goal
the positive improvement of our being in society. The concept of
human society remains flexible and available for change.
Nonetheless, a process of salvation, even if acceptable from a
critical perspective, raises other difficulties. Surely the opiate of
the masses seems incongruous with any theory inspired by
Marx. 114 Yet while Marxist theory suffers from fundamental
problems, particularly in the American context, its relation to reli-
gion is not one of them.11 5 It is not my intention to review here
the myriad and complex interactions between Marxist theory and
theology. Brief reference to the work of Walter Benjamin will suf-
fice to show that the left can little afford to abandon and reject
religious ideology.
114. As discussed infra, critical theory, particularly a critical legal theory, which is
overtly Marxist must confront other serious difficulties.
115. Marx himself offers a crucial insight into the inter-relationships between law, reli-
gion, and politics. He states:
The first task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, once the holy
form of human self-alienation has been discovered, is to discover self-alienation
in its unholy forms. The criticism of heaven is thus transferred into the criticism of
earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology into
the criticism of politics.
K. MARX, Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Introduction, in SE~rscrE WRrr-
INGs 64 (McLellan ed. 1977) (emphasis added).
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C. Secularizing the Revolution-Walter Benjamin's Dialectic Religion
Theology was clearly a major inspiration for Benjamin, one
of the most innovative of the Frankfurt School thinkers. The par-
ticular influence of Jewish scholarship, especially the intriguing in-
terpretive strategy of the Kabbalah, 116 is well-documented. The
whole process of historical materialism in general, and its histori-
cist methodology in particular, was for Benjamin impossible to
conceive in a way which was "thoroughly a-theological."1 l Benja-
min could not proceed by ignoring theology because theology and
critical theory shared, and continue to share, a common goal, the
redemption of humankind. Critical theory has always been a liber-
ation theology. While the reasons necessitating redemption, and
the path to be followed, differ, each shares with the other an his-
torical, social, and political heritage and context.
More important than the shared history and context-and
growing out of them-is shared language. Yet this language has
been shared in unequal portions. Because it was constituted first,
and because it has managed to spread its mythology beyond the
realm of pure religion into quotidian secular existence, theology
appears to have a claim on the vocabulary of redemption and sal-
vation. Critical theory has suffered from a temporal disadvantage,
as well as ideologically based hesitancy,118 which have prevented it
from making use of this powerful lexicon. While such hesitancy
may be understandable at one level, it remains in contradiction to
much of critical theory, particularly with the idea of immanent
critique. If the potentiality for radical change exists in society, it
must remain immanent in the linguistic-grammatical structures of
116. See G. SCHOLEM, WALTER BENJAMIN: THE STORY OF A FRIENDSHIP (1984). For a
good introduction to the Kabbalah and its relationship to criticism, see H. BLOOM, KAB-
BALAH AND CRITICISM (1984).
117. Benjamin, N[Theoretics of Knowledge; Theory of Progress], 15 PHIL F. 1, 19 (1983-
1984). Benjamin was not the only Frankfurt School member to recognize the necessity of
theology to the critical project. Adorno outlined his position as follows: Philosophie, wie sie
im Angesicht der Verzweiflung einsig noch zu verantworten ist, wdre der Versuch, alle Dinge so zu
betraechten, wie sie vom Standpunkt der Erlasung aus sich darstellan. (The only philosophy de-
fensible in the face of despair would be that which attempts to look at all things as they
present themselves from the standpoint of redemption). T. ADORNO, MINIMA MORALIA 333
(1970) (author's translation).
118. For an example of an ideologically inspired reluctance to seek solace in religion,
see G. SPIVAK, The Politics of Interpretations, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 347 (W.J.T.
Mitchell ed. 1983).
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that society." 9
Given the overt and covert power of the religious experience,
it is not surprising then that Benjamin would seek to recapture
the language of theology. The liberating vision of Frankfurt
School Marxism could only profit from a secularized redefinition
of this vocabulary. The role of critical theory, as Benjamin saw it,
is to take control of history and make it available to the proleta-
riat by redefining history in the language and the experience of
the oppressed and not in that of the "winners." 120 To ignore the
power of theology and its lexicon would have been, for Benjamin,
a betrayal of the workers. His goal was to secularize "redemption"
and to give it practical force in the service of dialectical
materialism.12
Like Benjamin, we cannot afford to ignore the power of reli-
gion and theology. The left cannot allow such a powerful tool
1 22
119. On deconstructing particular aspects of theology, see Derrida, Of an Apocalyptic
Tone Recently Adopted in Philosophy, 6 OXFORD LITERARY REV. 3 (1984).
120. Benjamin's goal was to dissolve mythology so that the forces of revolutionary
change could be actualized by "the awakening of a knowledge of the past that is not yet
conscious." Benjamin, supra note 117, at 3. Such an awakening would permit victory in the
class struggle.
121. Despite Benjamin's innovative perspective, his faith in historical materialism and
the dialectic of Marx was undoubting-i.e., "uncritical." See Tiedemann, Historical Materi-
alism or Political Messianism? An Interpretation of the Theses "On the Concept of History", 15
PHIL F. 71 (1983-1984). Tiedemann summarizes Benjamin's position: "Historical material-
ism 'enlists the services of theology': it is in control. Theology is the servant who must do
the work-who must take care of the thinking, so to speak." Id. at 85. For his analysis of
the poverty of Kantian notions of experience, see Benjamin, Program for the Coming
Philosoph, 15 PHIL F. 41 (1983-1984). For Benjamin, theology can capture and supply a
more complex notion of experience, opening a greater hermeneutic background for recon-
stituted society. This broadened complex notion of experience is clearly expressed; see W.
BENJAMIN, On Some Motifs in Baudelaire, in ILLUMINATIONS 155 (1973). Perhaps Benjamin's
desire to enlist theology in the service of the revolution is best seen in the following
example:
The story is told of an automaton constructed in such a way that it could play a
winning game of chess, answering each move of an opponent with a counter-
move. A puppet in Turkish attire and with a hookah in its mouth sat before a
chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mirrors created the illusion that
this table was transparent from all sides. Actually, a little hunchback who was
an expert chess player sat inside and guided the puppet's hand by means of
strings. One can imagine a philosopical counterpart to this device. The puppet
called "historical materialism" is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for
anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened
and has to keep out of sight.
W. BENJAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in IL.UMINATIONS, supra, at 253.
122. Jos6 Casanova offers an intriguing example of how the current resurgence of
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to be used against it. The vision of individual and community is
uniquely suited to the linguistic-grammatical world of theology. It
must be recaptured and given a practical, secular content without
losing the fervor-inspiring potential which is so often part of the
language of redemption. But it is at this level of practical imple-
mentation of the secularized, consecrated community that the left
in America has encountered its greatest difficulties. We must now
turn to the most coherent left theory, Marxism, to examine the
reasons for this failure. In particular, the writings of Mark
Tushnet are important for critical legal theory, for they provide
the clearest openly declared vision for American socialism.
III. CONSTRUCTING A VALUE-LADEN HERMENEUTICS
A. Marxism in America-Recapturing the Dream
Tushnet's hermeneutic framework is teleological; for
Tushnet, whatever will advance the cause of socialism is good.123
This simplified statement of belief points out the fundamental
practical weakness of Marxist thought in America. Two questions
spring to mind. What is good for socialism? Why is socialism good
for America?12
Important questions remain unanswered in critical legal
scholarship and Marxist thought in general. Which Marxism are
we to adopt? Debates among Marxists about the truth remain as
diverse and as controversial as debates among Christians concern-
ing the true meaning of the Bible. Is there, for example, a Marxist
theory of free speech?1 25 Should we accept press censorship in
interest in religion might provide certain elements for a progressive political revival. See
Casanova, The Politics of the Religious Revival, 15 TE.Los 3 (1984).
123. Tushnet, A Marxist Analysis of American Law, 1978 MARXIST PERsPECrIvEs 96;
Tushnet, Is There a Marxist Theory of Law?, 26 NoMos 171 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Tushnet, Marxist Theory of Law?].
124. Professor Tushnet feels pessimistic about the practical possibility of a socialist
America. More important, he is doubtful about the practical possibility of a Marxist theory
of law. Despite his pessimism, he remains hopeful in spirit.
125. Tushnet might reply that the category "free speech" has been defined too nar-
rowly to permit the development of proper Marxist theory. Tushnet, Is There a Marxist
Theory of Law?, supra note 123, at 171. But cf Lipson, Is There a Marxist Theory of Law?
Comments on Tushnet, 26 NoMos 119 (1983). For an interesting, eclectic, analysis of
Tushnet's Marxism, see Nash, In Re Radical Interpretations of American Law: The Relation of
Law and History, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 274, 314 (1983). See generally L. JAwrrsCH, THE GENERAL
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Nicaragua? Can we differentiate between the necessity of such ac-
tions in order to consolidate the gains of the revolution and the
desirability of censorship under the first amendment in modern
America? Before critical legal theory can hope to be persuasive in
the regulated marketplace of ideas,12 it must be able to define
and elucidate its position. The fact that the abandonment of the-
ory leads to belief does not eliminate the requirement of persua-
sion. Conversion to the left will result in part from the intuitive
appeal of its position and in part from "rational" debate about
values.
Rational criticism of liberalism exists as the major strength of
critical legal studies. A viable developed alternative on the left is
still missing. Failure to provide what at least appears to be a sys-
tematic response leads to acceptance of the critics' view of liber-
alism. Nihilism which offers no viable alternative is dangerous.
A related failure of the American left is its inability to per-
suade us of the desirability of (an as yet undefined) socialism. Why
is a Marxist hermeneutics useful? How will it open human experi-
ence to greater and greater potentialities? References to Gramsci's
theory of hegemony in advanced capitalist society provide evi-
dence of a willingness to engage in a hopeful enterprise.1 27 But do
they persuade? Why is Gramsci's description of capitalism in the
1920's persuasive in the America of the 1980's? Can we advance
from a somewhat abstract conception of the hegemonic tenden-
cies of American society to full or partial explanation of the con-
tinuing viability of liberal capitalism and the Western legal tradi-
tion? A teleological construct with practical, political appeal is
essential to success, particularly since examples of Marxism in ac-
THEORY OF LAW (1981); E.B. PASHUKANIS, LAW AND MARXISM, A GENERAL THEORY (1978).
Recent British work may also be instructive. See, e.g., LEGALrrY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE
(D. Sugarman ed. 1983). Perhaps the time has come to throw off the "Marxist" label. We
appear to sliend an inordinate amount of time arguing whether a "Marxist" can, or should,
believe in rights. Compare Lukes, Can a Marxist Believe in Rights?, 1 PRAXIS INT'L 334, 337
(1982) (no) with Cornell, Should a Marxist Believe in Rights?, 4 PRAXIS INt'L 45, 55 (1984)
(yes). Rather than spending our days searching the archives for a supporting quote from
Marx, we should simply recognize, that "our" philosophy is one of spirit, not of dogmatic
adherence to the writings of one man. Labels are not only unimportant, they are
restrictive.
126. This, of course, is traditional liberal imagery. Since transcendance at this level is
impossible, we must always operate to a certain extent within the historical (liberal)
framework.
127. Taylor, Deconstructing the Law (Book Review), 1 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 158 (1982).
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tion are more than disappointing.128
Perhaps appeal to the "inherent" justice and equality of a so-
cialist economy has an intuitive appeal. Indeed, American liberal
democracy has survived because of its ability to appropriate large
lumps of "socialist" solutions to societal problems. The left must
justify its contention that we will be "better off" if we go all the
way.
What can the left do to maintain and improve its position as a
viable "theoretical" alternative to liberal legalism? First and fore-
most, it must reply effectively to the most telling criticism levelled
against it: that its view is a flight "to excessive romanticism." 2
The reply proposed here is at once clearly available and extremely
dangerous. The tension between what is and what could be must
be accentuated. We must, as a matter of praxis, engage in dis-
course inside the American community, but we must do so from a
stance which supports the "abnormal." The left must propose a
plan, a hermeneutics, which is purposive and purposefully edify-
ing-a challenge to the normality of life and of law. "For edifying
discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of ourselves by
the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings." '
We must at once open up and close down the hermeneutic
possibilities. Exclusion and reform are at once desired and permit-
ted. Abnormal discourse from the left must have the courage of
its convictions. It should aspire to clearly define its discourse in
terms of its beliefs, and world vision. It will remain open to the
many sources of textuality which constitute human existence while
it must reject the pluralist vision of liberalism. It must, in other
128. It has been suggested that motherliness may offer a more positive, micro-example
of Marxism in action. The accuracy of this contention, without a more complete formula-
tion, raises complex and interesting questions. See Fitzpatrick, Marxism and Legal Pluralism,
1 AusTiL J. L. & So"'y 45 (1983).
129. Shiffrin, supra note 70, at 1110. While Shiffrin's analyses are insightiul and help-
ful in many respects, ultimately he fails to convince the reader that his "eclectic liberalism"
is either ontologically superior to, or a "better" practice than, "ecletic Marxism." The only
strength of his approach is that of liberalism in general: it is the powerful, historically domi-
nant ideology. His appeal appears to be to a theory the main strength of which is practical
hierarchical superiority.
130. R. RORTY, supra note 7, at 360. See also R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM
(1982). The Russian formalists saw this as the key function of literature. For an example of
the application of this notion of abnormal discourse as edifying project to modern Ameri-
can literature, see Smith, Performing in the Zone: The Presentation of Historical Crisis in Gray.
ity's Rainbow, 12 Cuio 245 (1983).
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words, express its willingness to exclude, on the basis of belief,
certain individuals and communities from the end-community to-
ward which it strives. Nazis (to pick a familiar example) must be
rejected. The "prejudice" against them must be convincingly
presented and their exclusion firmly maintained.
The dangers of such a strategy are clear. We risk mistaken
exclusion. We risk unjustifiable and unconvincing belief. Such
risks, within a proper hermeneutic framework, can be minimized.
We must avoid the "neutrality" of liberalism. At the same time,
our political position must be open to divergent points of view. If
it is to be socialist, it can not be doctrinaire. The greatest danger,
however, remains the strength of the practice of liberalism and its
support of an apparently value-free, rational normality. Abnormal
discourse, to be effective in reality, must be normalized. The in-
commensurable becomes commonplace. The left is co-opted and
liberalism strengthened.
Edifying discourse remains the only alternative to a collapse
into nihilism. Legal scholarship, liberal and critical, now has
reached its "moment of decadence." 131 We have realized the in-
herent contradictions of existing constitutional theories. We must
avoid normalization and recapture. We, as legal thinkers, operate
within a sphere of interpretation where authority is decided by
structure and where normality is determined by the authority of
the profession. Critical legal scholarship offers us the opportunity
to develop a healthy mistrust of our profession and of profession-
alism and theory in general.
While we attempt to escape the gravitational pull of "the sys-
tem" and the profession, we realize that we can never fully with-
draw. Being outside is referential; it is defined and determined by
the inside.'32 Any attempt to deconstruct includes involvement in
the system. But all hope is not lost. We must recognize that decon-
struction is necessary, that the "point of incision"133 is one chosen
131. More specifically, legal scholarship has been "simultaneously destroyed and de-
structive, destructuring, as is all consciousness, or at least the moment of decadence, which
is the period proper to all movement of consciousness." J. DERRIDA, supra note 51, at 6.
132. J. DERRIDA, supra note 5, at 10; J.P. SARTRE, supra note 52, at 238.
133.
The incision of deconstruction, which is not a voluntary decision of an absolute
beginning, does not take place just anywhere, or in an absolute elsewhere. An
incision, precisely, it can be made only according to lines of force and forces of
rupture that are localizable in the discourse to be deconstructed.
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of belief. It is a fundamentally political choice which, as a dialec-
tic, even as potentially hegemonic dialectic, as it unfolds, we must
take in order to escape normality. At this stage then, first-level
praxis must involve the development of a vision of society, and of
"practical" alternatives, which, while seemingly "abnormal," are
discernably possible. A theory of a reconstituted society in which
an open hermeneutics can exist is required. The goal of this first-
level praxis, then, is to restructure, in theory and practice, our
communal existence. The project is large, indeed global. The al-
ternatives are resignation and nihilism.
B. The Future: Pessimism v. Optimism
Readers may reply: "We accept the failures of both liberalism
and critical legal scholarship. Concern with majoritarianism, in
whatever form, is misplaced. Detailed theories which grant canon-
ical status to hierarchy falsify and obstruct our discussions about
value. What have you offered? Critical legal scholarship has not
defined or convinced others of its framework. What system do you
offer for praxis?"13
The reader is correct. The answer is not offered here-nor,
even, is an answer. Rather, Marcuse's hermeneutics could be
invoked.
(1) The transcendent project must be in accordance with the real pos-
sibilities open at the attained level of the material and intellectual culture.
(2) The transcendent project, in order to falsify the established totality,
must demonstrate its own higher rationality in the threefold sense that
(a) it offers the prospect of preserving and improving the produc-
tive achievements of civilization;
(b) it defines the established totality in its very structure, basic ten-
dencies, and relations;
(c) its realization offers a greater chance for the pacification of exis-
tence, within the framework of institutions which offer a greater chance
for the free development of human needs and faculties.
Obviously, this notion of rationality contains, especially in the last statement,
a value judgment, and I reiterate what I stated before: I believe that the
very concept of Reason originates in this value judgment, and that the con-
J. DERRIDA, POSrTONs 82 (1981) (emphasis in original).
134. Such a project is beyond the scope of this paper. The present goal is only to
point out the sterile nature of current constitutional scholarship. The next synthetic stage
of development must be true discussion of values (e.g., people must be fed, workers must
control the means of production and exchange).
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cept of truth cannot be divorced from the value of Reason."3 5
The invocation of the Marcusian framework as that upon
which critical (legal) praxis should be built raises 'the crucial issue
of whether optimism or pessimism should be the dominant ideo-
logical mindset of the left. The debate between the two views has
waged for many years13 6 and has centered again on the possibility
of immanent critique and change in advanced Western society.
According to the optimistic view, of which Habermas and
Marcuse are the most famous proponents, modern capitalism con-
tains within it the seeds of its own destruction and the flowering
of the new age. While disavowing the blatantly erroneous vision of
classical, automatic Marxism of the proletariat as the revolution-
ary class,137 the optimists of the Frankfurt School nonetheless
maintain faith in the dialectic.
On the other hand, the pessimists, of whom Adorno and
Horkheimer,133 are the most typical, have never been fully con-
vinced of the possibility of positive, emancipatory change. While
sharing with the optimists the general theories of the failings of
modern society, they remain overwhelmed by the incredible stay-
ing power of liberalism. They are unable to truly believe that
qualitative change can be obtained in a cultural matrix where the
dominant structures and ideology are so flexible and capable of
such large quantitative change. If the proposal for a newly con-
secrated secular hermeneutics is to have any validity, the optimist-
pessimist debate must be dealt with and some tentative solution
offered.
Habermas, with his theory of the availability of a general
135. H. MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN, supra note 3, at 220. The relationship be-
tween hermeneutics and critical social theory has yet to be fully developed.
136. For an introduction to the various points of view, see generally Arato, Immanent
Critique and Authoritarian Socialism, 7 CAN. J. POL. & Sor- THEORY 146 (1983); Habermas,
Some Conditions for Revolutionizing Late Capitalist Societies [1968J, 7 CAN. J. POL & Soc THE-
ORY 32 (1983); Habermas, History and Revolution, 10 Trios 5 (1979); Honneth, Communica-
tion and Reconciliation: Habermas' Critique of Adorno, 10 Trios 43 (1979); Lefort, On the
Genesis of Ideology in Modern Societies, 7 CAN. J. PoL & Soc. THEORY 43 (1983); Raulet, What
Good is Schopenhauer? Remarks on the Horkheimer's Pessimism, 11 Trios 98 (1980).
137. This is particularly true of Marcuse's hope in the revolutionary potential of the
student agitation during the Vietnam War and the alleged unity of the interests of students
and workers which was invoked in the heady aftermath of events in France in May 1968.
See H. MARCUSE, COUNTERREVOLUTION AND REVOLT (1972).
138. See Adorno & Horkheimer, supra note 3.
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communicative action and rationality,139 would appear to offer an
obvious solution. Indeed, his work has clearly influenced much of
today's left scholarship, including the endeavours of critical legal
studies. 140 Unfortunately, Habermas's optimism is difficult to ac-
cept. True, one readily can accept his view that the state, or the
public sphere, 41 must be truly democratized so that a new form
of hermeneutic debate and reflection can take place. Neverthe-
less, there appears to be a fundamental flaw in Habermas's own
historical theory.142 This theory is based on a close analysis of the
emergence of the modern democratic state and relies in particular
on the proposition that a politically active public, consisting of in-
dividuals distinct from the official state apparatus, constituted, in
an open communicative practice, the universalization of those
norms which we now associate with Western democratic ideals.
For example, constitutionally guaranteed rights of free speech
had the potential of being truly democratic because they were re-
alized and implemented through a relatively open reflective com-
municative practice, in a public sphere in which the state did not
necessarily interfere. Their social base simply had to be extended
for democracy to be more fully realized.
The rise of the welfare state and late modern capitalism has,
however, undermined Habermas's argument that a particularly
active public, engaged in an open discussion and articulation of
values, is immanent in our society. The rise of interest groups, as
a concomitant development of the appropriation of the public
sphere and state apparatus by private agglomerations, with non-
139. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 3; 1 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
Ac'rON (1984).
140. See, e.g., Sumner, Law, Legitimation and the Advanced Capitalist State: The Jurispru-
dence and Social Theory ofJurgen Habermas, in LEGALrrY, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE 119 (D.
Sugarman ed. 1983).
141. Some writers do not portray Habermas as an eternal optimist. Peter Hohendal
argues that Habermas shares Horkheimer's pessimism. Hohendal's view (a Marxist instru-
mentalist one) is premised on the existence of a proletarian public sphere which contains
great potential disruptive force; he claims Habermas denies this sphere. See Hohendal,
Jfirgen Habermas: "The Public Sphere" (1964), NEW GERMAN CRrrIQUE, Fall 1974, at 45. This
is an accurate description in the sense that Habermas cannot be classified as a "Marxist," in
the classic sense. This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that Habermas is a cultural
pessimist. For Habermas, a potentially public sphere does exist; it is simply not a proletarian
one.
142. This section of the Article was inspired largely by the work of Jean Cohen. See
Cohen, Why More Political Theory, 12 TELos 70 (1979).
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universal claims to values, has meant that the same public sphere,
the key to Habermas's liberating immanent critique, has been re-
duced to a private battleground. The institutional basis on which
a free hermeneutics could be built no longer exists. Habermas has
been reduced to utopian claims.' 43
Such a bleak view is frightening. If an open, public herme-
neutics is impossible, if it is blocked by an ultimately inflexible in-
stitutional practice and structure, we will soon be reduced to nihil-
istic abandon. This fear of nihilism has lead to recent attempts to
rescue immanent critique from its apparent fate. Of such at-
tempts, two are of particular interest. Each in its own way points
toward a third path to effective critical theory and, ultimately
(with faith, love, and hope), to redemption.
C. Three Paths to a New Heresy
1. Retracing a False Path. The first attempted resurrection of
critical thought is one which appears to have had a profound ef-
fect on critical legal theory. This first path-clearly part of
Tushnet's project-tries to explain why Marxism has remained a
marginal activity in America. Once an explanation is proffered, it
tries to construct a way in which this ideology can move closer to
mainstream thought and practice. In its strongest manifestation, it
argues (largely inspired by Weberian sociology) that certain myth-
structures and symbols which form the psychic heart of America
contain an element of progressivity from which we can construct
an immanent critique and plan for future action. Trent Schroyer
has labeled this "cultural surplus."' 44
Schroyer's theory is a derivative of Habermas's discussion of
"the public sphere." Schroyer contends that while theoretically
Habermas was correct, his analysis of the bankruptcy of natural
law and the republican tradition is, in the American context,
wrong. These post-Habermasian proponents of the idea of cul-
143.
[lilt is not surprising that Habermas can offer only an abstract alternative of the
present organization of late capitalism, for on the basis of his original analysis
of the decline of the public realm, he can neither situate his utopia of political
freedom nor identify a dynamic pressing towards its realization.
Cohen, supra note 142, at 82.
144. Schroyer, Cultural Surplus in America, NEw GERMAN CRITIQUE, Spring-Summer
1982, at 81. He defines "cultural surplus" as those "traditional cultural symbols that retain
their capacity to anticipate utopian alternatives to existing realities."
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tural surplus argue in support of the strength and liberating po-
tential of a certain social mythology. "Equality," as an essential
element of the American dream, would be part of the cultural,
symbolic surplus from which it would be possible to build a theory
of "real" equality-that is, socialism. Much of the work of critical
legal studies can be seen as an attempt to use the law, especially
the Constitution, as a concrete manifestation of this cultural sur-
plus.. Thus, argues Schroyer, the mythology of equality, put into
practice in the desegregation of official structures, can be used to
achieve further qualitative improvement, leading eventually to a
society constructed on socialist principles.
Such a vision of the law suffers from several difficulties. It re-
lies in large part on the maintenance of a hierarchical court struc-
ture. Moreover, because of its incremental and instrumentalist ele-
ments, 145 it follows the fate of all other immanent critique: it
cannot deal adequately with the power with which the institutions
and practices of modern capitalism are able to confront societal
myth. In other words, the cultural surplus, when recognized as
such in practice, can be just as easily exploited by the existing ide-
ology for its own purposes. The language, myth and symbolism of
the surplus are simply incorporated by an existing power and are
used to block hermeneutic freedom.
2. The Second Path: Power and Failure. Since the institutional
power structure, with its own mythology, appears to trump any
use of myth as a source of liberation, some have followed a second
path to immanent critique: resurrecting the work of Michel Fou-
caultI14 for implementation in a leftist agenda. However, the man-
ner in which Foucault is being used is surprising; ultimately, it will
undermine the effort. From this failure, however, will grow a lib-
erating vision of effective critique.
Foucault's views are extremely complex but relatively well
-known; no attempt will be made here to provide the definitive en-
145. For a good introduction to the problems inherent in such views, see Tushnet,
Marxism as Metaphor (Book Review), 61 CORNELL L. R1v. 281 (1983).
146. See, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1980); M. FOUcAULT, THE ORDER OF
THINGs: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN ScIENcEs (1970). Typical of the machinations nec-
essary for this attempted resurrection are, Rajchman, Foucault's Dilemma, Soc. TEXT, Win-
ter 1983-1984, at 3, and Dews, Power and Subjectivity in Foucault, NEw LEFT REV., Mar.-Apr.
1984, at 70. For a critical rejection of the applicability of Foucault to current, concrete
struggle, see Rorty, Habermas and Lyotard on Post-Modernity, 4 PRAXIS INT'L 32 (1984).
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capsulation of them. For present purposes, it is important to note
a few, perhaps oversimplified, basics: Foucault sees all social and
personal relations as revolving, necessarily, around power and
subjugation. The radical discontinuities (which he finds in human
history and which lead him to reject dialectical materialism) can
be explained by reference to subjugation. Power is found in many
forms-from overt physical domination to the existing modern
form of a societal ideology which creates self-administered
subjugation.147
The fundamental difficulty with any attempt to resurrect Fou-
cault for a practical, leftist critique is that his views lack a coher-
-ent starting point. While Foucault may have shared, by intuition,
many goals with the left, his mistrust of all ideology prevented
him from developing a coherent framework upon which others
could build. Foucault believed that we must distrust all ideology
and power. In Foucault, there is neither a normative base nor a
political theory from which we might draw practical guidance. All
relationships are oppressive, all forms of interaction involve subju-
gation and power. In the end, there is no ground for criticism or
for preferring one form of freedom over another because there is
no freedom. Marxist visions of liberation are as false and as
power-dominated as are Fascist ones. If we need more political
theory we will not find it in Foucault. Yet those who see in Fou-
cault hope for a radical praxis are not far wrong. For it is inFou-
cault's unrelenting mistrust of power that we can find the ideas
which will permit the development of the new secularized fervor.
3. Desire. In the preface to the English-language version of
Anti-Oedipus,148 Foucault offers the opinion that Deleuze and
Guattari present a program for anti-fascist living. He repeats his
warning that we must not become enamored of power and argues
for the constitution of a new community, one which "must not be
147. In this view of modern society, Foucault draws remarkably close to the theories
of the Frankfurt School. See generally Raulet, Structuralism and Post-Structuralism- An Inter-
view with Michel Foucault, 16 TE.os 195, 200 (1983).
148. Foucault, Preface to G. DELEUZE & F. GUATTARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND
SCHIZOPHRENIA at xiii (1983).. The second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, G.
DELEUZE & F. GUATTARI, MILLE PLTEAUX CAPITALISME ET SCHIZOPHRtNIE (1980) is not
available in English. But see G. DELEUZE & F. GUATTARi, ON THE LINE (1983) [hereinafter
cited as ON THE LINE]; F. GUATTARI, MOLECULAR REVOLUTION: PSYCHIATRY AND POLITICS
(1984).
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the organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals. 1' 49 The "politi-
cal" theory presented by Deleuze and Guattari is that of desire.
Like Foucault's earlier vision of power and subjugation, however,
desire cannot, by itself, form a political theory. As Deleuze and
Guattari themselves recognize, desire contains within its general
nature two opposed potentialities. The first of these, the "molar"
personality, leads to fascism. 150 The second, the "molecular" per-
sonality, when actualized, leads to freedom-and, when combined
with a broader social theory, to socialism.
The question which presents itself, then, is this: How can the
American left permit the realization of desire in its molecular
form? How can we achieve this liberation of the individual if im-
manent critique is, if not impossible, not presently conceivable?
In the remainder of this Article, a proposal for personal ac-
tion will be set forth." It echoes the notions of secularized reli-
gion and abnormal discourse, 52 and that the liberating vision of
desire is present in theology. The notion of abjection and horror
which presents itself when we recognize the problem of solidarity,
when we recognize the I/Other separation into which we are
thrown by our existence, is potentially reconcilable through
salvation.
Desire, in its liberating form, is threatening to existing ideol-
ogy simply because desire attacks that ideology at its very founda-
tion, the I/Other dichotomy.1 53 A vision which permits us to ap-
149. Foucault, supra note 148, at xiv.
150. "Groups and individuals contain micro-fascisms that only ask to be crystallized."
G. DELEUZE & F. GUArrARI, Rhizome, in ON THE LINE, supra note 148, at 18.
151. This portion of the Article has been influenced by the work ofJulia Kristeva. See
J. KRISTEVA, POWERS OF HORROR: AN ESSAY ON ABJECTION (1982). The influence is mani-
fested as impression rather than accurate reflection.
152. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. The idea of abnormal discourse here
takes on a slightly more anarchic tone. Abnormal discourse at this level is meant to serve as
a complement and counter-weight to first-level abnormal discourse. It is an aggravated
form, a mutation. At this level, moreover, abnormal discourse remains highly individual-
ized and largely ineffective. Because true freedom comes only when the molecular revolu-
tion can take place in the context of a broader reconstitution of civil society, the develop-
ment of a social theory remains the larger, primary task.
153. A secular religion based on the right desire becomes the ultimate form of subver-
sion because it is based on an alien psychology. Deleuze offers the following hopeful
perspective:
Instead of betting on the eternal impossibility of the revolution and on the fas-
cist return of the war machine in general, why not think that a new type of
revolution is becoming possible, and that all kinds of mutant machines are alive,
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proximate an I/Other union, to form a community of desire, is
destructive of current power bases. As Kristeva points out,15 how-
ever, the strength of religion has been its ability to "hierarchize"
the vision of desire and to sublimate the union by changing its
nature from one of present human community to one of divine
and future community (the Kingdom of God). Thus, religious he-
gemony resembles liberal hegemony, of which it is part.
It is here that we must return to abnormal discourse. We
must allow desire to be used in the service of liberation. If we
recapture the language of redemption and salvation, we will have
taken the first step. The next step, the one which remains prob-
lematic, is the adaptation of abnormal discourse to the idea of
redemption.
CONCLUSION:
ABNORMAL DISCOURSE-IN FAVOR OF HERESY
Abnormal discourse, if it is to escape totalizing and repressive
dialogue, must become heretical. We cannot sit atop a pillar year
after year, nor will wearing a hair shirt lead to the subversion of
the present structure. We must invent new forms of heresy and
ascetic vision. 55 We must engage in acts of "moral terrorism"1 56
engaged in warfare, joining one another, and tracing a place of consistence that
undermines the organizational plan of the World State?
G. DELEUZE, Politics, in ON THE LINE, supra note 148, at 113.
154. See J. KRisTEVA, supra note 151, at 90-112.
155. The socio-historical context calls for a newer version of the ascetic goals of our
generation. They are perhaps best summarized by a character from a Leonard Cohen
novel: "Do you know what the ambition of our generation is, Wanda? We all want to be
Chinese mystics living in thatched huts, but getting laid frequently." L. COHEN, THE FA-
VOURITE GAME 192 (1963).
156. Moral terrorism seeks to avoid reform at all costs. For example, in the academy,
rather than encouraging our students and colleagues to engage in left-wing study groups,
where they can escape from the mysteries of trespass on the case to theinherent clarity of
Derrida's Of Grammatology, we should encourage them to learn a socially useful
trade-playing the piano, for example-and to abandon law school forever. We can dis-
rupt faculty meetings with various acts of civil or, preferably, uncivil disobedience. We can
engage in subversion by memorandum. The possibilities are limited only by the available
concepts of the absurd.
Several objections could be raised against this version of moral terrorism; especially that
it is juvenile. This is true. It is juvenile. The very point of moral terrorism is to permit us
to recapture the halcyon days of our youth, when freedom was an unquestioned compo-
nent of our daily existence. A perpetuation of childhood or adolescence can have a highly
liberating effect. Besides, it really bothers the liberals.
It is important to place the entire practice of abnormal discourse in its proper context.
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in the name of community. Current notions of critical theory fail
largely because they insist upon a limited version of immanence.
Abnormal discourse may succeed because it can involve a new
form of individual revival. Like a genetic mutation, it is immanent
in a limited sense. Like a genetic mutation, it is new in a limitless
sense.
Abnormal discourse in this (heretical) mutation calls for us to
follow the skeptical path disapproved by Unger. 157 It becomes a
grand refus. The reservation which this new vision of heresy seeks
to add to our current discourse is neither agnostic nor is it tacked
onto an unreformed practice. It is filled with and inspired by a
vision of revival and salvation. Redemption, not disbelief, is its
motivating source. Nor is it resigned. It is not resigned because it
neither seeks nor claims universality. It presupposes that the
"mainstream" congregation of critical scholars will continue to
seek a coherent critique. It presupposes at least some form of soli-
darity in the concrete practice for progressive reform, even in its
quantitive, incremental manifestation. Heresy presupposes ortho-
doxy. At the same time, it seeks to avoid capture by this ortho-
doxy, either in its critical manifestations or its liberal hegemony.
Abnormal discourse, as mutated heresy, has as its simple goal the
constant questioning of all practice while hope is maintained. The
moment of decadence in liberal scholarship has arrived. Heresy
ensures that such decadence does not capture criticism.
This vision of moral terrorism may appear to approach dan-
gerously close to the nihilism it seeks to avoid. The danger is not
unreal. Nonetheless, it is only by unveiling the horror of existence
and squarely facing the abyss that we can avoid it. The appear-
ance of nihilism becomes at once fascinating and horrifying. Only
by maintaining a heretical passion for desire can we overcome the
vertigo of resignation. The position of abnormal discourse is not
one of resigned pessimism. It is born of a hope for redemption. Its
apparent cynicism is simply the means by which it avoids recap-
Moral terrorism is a strategy for praxis by a limited number of well-meaning intellectuals
with limited goals. It is a highly personalized attempt to bring street theater to the work-
place. It allows us to vent our rage in a (de)constructive manner, thereby preserving our
sanity and fervor for first-level struggle.
157. "Precisely because of its extremism, the scorched-earth campaign of radical skep-
ticism is also ineffective: it allows us to tack an agnostic reservation onto an unreformed
practice." R. UNGER, supra note 113, at 46.
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ture and maintains its position of distrust. 15
The community of scholars which shares the intuition that a
larger, socialist hermeneutic framework remains not only possible
but essential must now set to work defining and justifying the val-
ues which are to constitute its point of reference. The problem
with liberalism is that its theory is incoherent while its practice
remains powerful and pervasive. The problem with critical
thought is that it lacks praxis.
What cannot be denied is that the moment of decadence in
legal scholarship, both liberal and critical, has arrived. The pall
has been lifted. Decadence is neither fatal nor determinative. A
greater revelation-and with it, perhaps, redemption-await.
The vision of abnormal discourse remains one of enlighten-
ment and liberation. These goals must be of our own creation, we
can expect nothing from the hierarchical he-God of liberalism.
One enlightened social critic has already provided our credo; it is
for us to concretize it with desire.
Most people think great god will come from sky/ take away everything,
make everybody feel high/ but if you know what life is worth/ you will
look for yours here on earth/ now you see the light, you stand up for your
rights.
-Bob Marley
158. In reality this is a call for the return of the carnival in everyday life. See supra
note 97. Kristeva opines that "Carnival ... does not keep to the rigid, that is, moral posi-
tion of apocalyptic inspiration; it trangresses it, sets its repressed against it-the lower
things, sexual matters, what is blasphemous and to which it holds while mocking the law."
J. KRtsTEVA, supra note 151, at 205.
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